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Two Trees or One?-The Problem of
Intra- Enterprise Conspiracy
By RICHARD V. BARNDT*
INTRODUCTION
An analysis of the Federal Antitrust Laws in action, while revealing
that many types of conduct are easily established as being hard core viola-
tions, clearly indicates that other types of conduct still remain in the cate-
gory where neither logic nor experience appear to justify a conclusive de-
termination of legality.' The purpose of the present paper is to treat the
topic of intra-enterprise conspiracy, one of the most perplexing of these
"twilight" areas.2 In addition to defining and evaluating the types of con-
duct included in the concept, and considering the cases dealing with the
problem, an attempt will be made to direct permissible courses of action,
rather than simply to proscribe that conduct which is possibly hazardous.
While it should be conceded that negative counseling, being preventive in
character, has a time-honored place in the legal profession, it should likewise
be recognized that the duty to give positive counseling, in the nature of
alternative and permissible courses of conduct, is equally as important.
There are three distinct, though connected, types of relationships which
give rise to conduct possibly included within the area of intra-enterprise
conspiracy. These are: first, the situation where the officers of a single
corporate body engage in conduct among themselves in carrying out the
business of the corporation; secondly, dealings between a parent and its sub-
sidiary or subsidiaries or dealings merely between the latter ;' and thirdly,
transactions between corporate bodies controlled by the same individual or
* Assistant Professor of Law, Montana State University; Member of the Utah Bar;
B.S.L. 1959, LL.B. 1960, University of Utah.
'For an extensive presentation and analysis of problems posed in this area see
Johnston, Some Twilight Zone Antitrust Problems, 1 ANTITRUST BuL. 615 (196).
The author observes that "no doubt many of you will say that most antitrust
problems, because of the generality and vagueness of the statutes, are in the Twi-
light Zone." Id. at 615.2This problem has received extensive treatment, and has caused a divergence of
opinion both as to the is and to the ought as will appear from an analysis of the
authorities cited throughout this article. These range from the position taken that
the conspiracy clauses of the Sherman Act can reach activities undertaken by
corporate officers among themselves, Kramer, Does Concerted Action Solely Be-
tween a Corporation and Its Officers Acting on Its Behalf in Unreasonable Re-
straint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act? 11 Fm). B.J.
130 (1951), to the position that "unless it contravenes the monopoly provisions, an
organization compared of a single enterprise [and this includes vertical integration
by the pyramiding of corporations] is entitled to freedom from Sherman Act lia-
bility." McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. REv. 183, 214-15 (1955). Perhaps the latest "official" al-
lusion to the problem was in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 82 Sup. Ct.
486 (1962), where the Court, in answer to an argument that the defendant could
not conspire with itself, stated that "this begs the question for the allegation is
that independent parties . . . conspired with CBS and its officers." 82 Sup. Ct. at
489. The Court observed in a' footnote that it would not pass upon the contention
of the plaintiff that the defendant's corporate arrangement of divisions "came
within the rule as to corporate subsidiaries." Id. at 489 n.4. This implies at the
least the continuing vitality of the conspiracy charge in a multicorporate setting.
"That is, the dealings may be between the parent and its subsidiary(ies), or be-
tween the sister corporations themselves to the exclusion of the parent.
158 1
Barndt: Two Trees or One? - The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1961
19621 INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONSPIRACY 159
group of individuals. Though all these relationships are occasionally de-
scribed as being "intra-corporate" it would appear that properly they are
described as "intra-enterprise" while "intra-corporate" more properly
should be restricted to the first of the three relationships-i.e., the conduct
of a single corporation's officers acting in its behalf.'
Transactions occurring in any of these three contexts give rise to in-
tra-enterprise conduct. The problem to be resolved is to decide if, and
when, the conduct in question can be held to be conspiratorial and hence
satisfy the requirements of a Sherman Act conspiracy.' At this point it
may be well to point out that the topic under consideration is concerned
only with that type of conduct which requires the cooperation of two or
more persons Hence any type of conduct which utilizes but one party for
its performance poses no particular problem in the present context. Thus
a corporation acting alone, acting with its subsidiaries, or with a brother
or sister corporation, or acting with another corporation controlled by the
same interests, is clearly subject to the proscriptions of the non-conspiracy
portion of section 2 of the Sherman Act."
'This is the terminology employed by the Attorney General's National Committee,
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
30 (1955) (Hereinafter cited Committee Report), and seems preferable to other
designations. For instance, the use of the term "inter-corporate" to describe a
class two or three transaction, as in Comment, 100 PA. L. R v. 1006, 1010 (1952),
is so general that it also covers transactions between unrelated corporations.5
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is hereby declared to be illegal .. " 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1958). "Every person who shall
monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .. "
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1958). It should be noted that this section would be more clear
if the comma following "persons" had been placed two words to the right, after
"monopoly."
6
"The accepted definition of a conspiracy is, a combination of two or more persons
by concerted action to accomplish a criminal or unlawful purpose, or to accomplish
some purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful by criminal or unlawful means."
Duplex Printing Press Company v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 465 (1921). Though no
one definition of conspiracy has been adopted, it is conceded that the nature of the
thing requires at least two active parties. Thus it is said that to define conspiracy
as a "combination between two or more persons to accomplish a criminal or un-
lawful act, or to do a lawful act by criminal or unlawful means .... is needlessly
verbose ... since one party cannot combine with himself ... ." PERKINS, CRIMINAL
LAW 528 (1957). And Justice Holmes referred to conspiracy as a "partnership in
criminal purposes." United States v. Kissel, 218 U.S. 601, 608 (1910), which again
highlights the requirement of duality of participants. It has been submitted that
conspiracy requires the three qualities of subjective agreement, duality of partici-
pants, and method as a subordination to an unlawful result. Ruhl, CONSPIRACY AND
THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 44 IlL. L. REv. 743, 751-52 (1950).
'Obviously, Section 1 always requires two or more parties, since a contract or a
combination can no more be formed by an individual acting alone than can a con-
spiracy. But both the monopolization and the attempt to monopolize clauses of
Section 2 require but one person for their accomplishment. It has been asserted
that the test of conspiracy under Section 2 creates a lesser problem in this regard
than does the test under Section 1. "Since monopolization is made a crime by it-
self, conspiracy to monopolize is clearly analogous to the ordinary conspiracy cases
in which a corporation and its officers have been held to be capable of forming a
conspiracy. Yet to apply a different test to a charge of conspiracy in restraint of
trade than to a charge of conspiring to monopolize results in making the word
"conspiracy" in Section 1 exclude conduct which the word "conspire" in Section 2
embraces. It is an elementary canon of statutory construction that, absent some
positive contrary indication, the same word wherever used in the same statute has
the same meaning." Kramer, supra note 2, at 135.
2
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On the other hand, section 1 of the Sherman Act declares to be unlaw-
ful "every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade. . .. ' This section, therefore, is the focal
point of the intra-enterprise conspiracy concept. Since the section is by
definition inapplicable to a single entity, any proceeding which must de-
pend upon it for successful prosecution must first hurdle the obstacle of
the single enterprise defense.'
The respective positions of the prosecutor and the defense in such a
proceeding may be likened to that of the landowner and the tree remover
who were faced with the problem of determining, for the purpose of a per
unit contract, whether a botanical growth which forked immediately at the
level of the ground was one tree or two trees. While the landholder firmly
asserted that "these two trees are one," the woodsman was equally ada-
mant in stressing that "this is two trees."1  Without debating the con-
notations implicit in the observation that, in such an instance, one's view
would depend, in the absence of the subjective motives possessed by the two
actors, on whether he were a squirrel or a gopher, the cases which have
dealt with or avoided the problem will be considered."
INTRA-CORPORATE CONDUCT
Perhaps the most troublesome of the three situations under considera-
tion involves those cases wherein a single corporation or its officers or
both, are charged, with a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act or that
portion of section 2 which requires a plurality of actors,' for conduct solely
between such corporation and its officers or between the officers them-
selves.'
Representative of much of the present thinking in this area is that
of the Attorney General's National Committee which stated :"
It has long been the law that where a corporation commits a sub-
stantive crime, the officers and directors who participated in the
illicit venture are guilty of criminal conspiracy .... But because
Section 1 of the Sherman Act does not make restraining trade, as
distinguished from a Section 2 charge of monopolizing trade, a
substantive offense, it does not follow as a matter of logic that the
concerted action of corporate officers acting on the corporation's
behalf . . . constitutes a conspiracy in violation of Section 1.
(Emphasis added.)
After asserting that .those cases which have held such conduct violative of
Section 1 could be sustained upon other grounds, and that in no case has a
eSee note 5 supra.
'See note 7 8upra, and note 74 infra.
'For the purpose of giving credit where credit is due the author acknowledges that
this episode was related to him while he was enrolled at the College of Law of the
University of Utah, by Professor Thomas Christy Chapin, who is now practicing
law in Denver, Colorado. If memory serves me correctly the dispute was said to
have occurred on the campus of the University of Connecticut.
"Needless to say, the subjective motivations are not limited to the anecdotal context.
"That is, with the conspiracy portion as opposed to the substantive monopolization,
or the less stringent "attempt" provision. See note 7 supra.
"As to the need for exactitude in the use of language in this setting see note 134
infra.
'"CoMMIrrmIE REPORT 30-31,
[Vol. 23,
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court found a violation where the Section 1 charge was independent of col-
lateral support,' the Report continues in a vein which indicates that the
italicized portion could be phrased in this manner: It follows as a, matter
of logic that the concerted action of corporate officers acting on the cor-
poration's behalf does not constitute a conspiracy in violation of section 1.
Thus they state that :"
Restraining trade is not illegal, but only contracting, combining
and conspiring in restraint of trade. Since a corporation can only
act through its officers, and since the normal commercial conduct
of a single trader acting alone may restrain trade, many activities
of any business could be interdicted were joint action solely by
the agents of a single corporation acting on its behalf itself held
to constitute a conspiracy in restraint of trade. (Emphasis added.)
Without disputing the lack of desirability of the effects forecast by the
Committee" or the logical conclusion felt to be impelled therefrom, an
analysis will be made of the cases to determine whether a judicial attitude
was a precursor to the Committee's position and to see whether that atti-
tude is correctly reflected in the Committee Report.
One of the first cases to consider the intra-corporate phase of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy concept was Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States.'
The defendants, Union Pacific Coal Company, James M. Moore-its agent,
Union Pacific Railroad, Oregon Short Line Railroad, and Everett Buck-
ingham-agent for the railroads, were charged with, and convicted of, com-
bining,' (conspiring) in violation of section 1, to deprive a Salt Lake City
coal dealer (Sharp) of his supply of coal. On appeal by defendants the
court observed that "there is nothing in the Act of July 2, 1890, which de-
prived the coal company of [certain] common rights of . . . vendors of
merchandise, and if it did not combine with some other person or persons
so to do its refusal to sell its coal to Sharp ... was not the violation of the
Sherman anti-trust Act charged in the indictment.' m
'Thus they state that "the only reported decisions on the question have found no
conspiracy in restraint of trade in joint action solely between a corporation and
its officers acting in its behalf." CoMmisiTrEE REPORT at 31. However, it should be
noted that there is a good deal of difference between stating that no decision has
found a conspiracy and stating that cases have found that there could be no con-
spiracy. Yet, the cases they cite for their proposition could be cited for the latter
position at least by dictum if not holding.
'
8CoNIMIWrEr REPORT at 31. The Committee seemed to fear that to accept the intra-
corporate conspiracy rationale would be to spell the demise of organized business
activity, and that accordingly the cause of this calamitous occurrence should,
though conceived, be aborted. Though it may be conceded that if this "parade of
imaginable horrible" were a real possibility, the suggested cure should be used to
remove the bane, it would further appear that other alternatives may present them-
selves. See note 283 infra.
"'See notes 175-82 in fra, and accompanying text. And see Kramer, supra note 2, at
141, where he states that if this result were reached "a significant loophole would
be afforded corporations engaging, without the assistance of outsiders, in activities
that unreasonably restrain trade."
18173 Fed. 737 (8th Cir. 1909).
'"Though the charge in the indictment was that the defendants had combined to per-
form the challeged acts, in substance the problem is the same as If a conspiracy
had been charged.. Indeed it is not clear where the two terms meet and where
they part company. Thus part of the definition of conspiracy is that it is a com-
bination of two or more persons for a stated purpose. See note 6 supra. Hence it
would seem that any combination which results in a restrain of trade of an un-
reasonable nature could also be attacked as a conspiracy.
n73 Fed. at 739.
1962]
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In spite of the common stock ownership,' the undisputed finding that
Buckingham and the railroads did not know that Moore had cut off Sharp's
supply until two days after the fact was held to prove that the latter three
defendants were not parties to a combination.' Hence any unlawful com-
bination would necessarily lie between the coal company and its agent
Moore. In reply to the government's argument that the testimony was
sufficient to convict them of combining (conspiring) with each other, the
court stated :"
But no case has been called to our attention that sustains the posi-
tion that an agent of a corporation may alone form an unlawful
combination between himself and his corporation by his thoughts
and acts within the scope of his agency, without the knowledge or
participation of any other agent or officer of the corporation. If
he may, the distinction between the commission of an offense and
a combination to commit it by a corporation vanishes into thin air.
. ..The union of two or more persons. the conscious participation
in the scheme of two or more minds, is indispensable to an un-
lawful combination, and it cannot be created by the action of one
man alone. (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted for purposes of later development that the court by
negative implication left open the possibility of a violation where -two or
more officers are involved. However, it also should be noted that the same
reasoning which the court used to strike down the government's present
allegation is frequently used to refute the implication of the court's dic-
tum."
The next case of importance to emerge in chronological order is Pat-
terson v. United States.' In commenting on this case the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Committee stated that "despite the holding in Patterson as
well as White Bear under Section 1, plaintiffs in both cases charged viola-
tions of Section 2, thus making unnecessary to the result the brief discussion
of the applicability of Section 1 to, these facts."' (Emphasis added.) The
Committee had previously stated that the case concluded that a group of
corporate employees of the National Cash Register Company, including its
president, John H. Patterson, could be held guilty of violating sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act where the employees carried out a predatory
policy looking to a monopoly of the cash register business.
'The Union Pacific Railroad owned all of the stock in the coal company. 173 Fed.
at 741.MId. at 744. The court further pointed out that after learning of the actions of
Moore, the agents of the other corporate defendants were powerless to interfere.
2173 Fed. at 745.
""... [E]very time an agent commits an offense within the scope of his authority
under this theory the corporation necessarily combines with him to commit it."
173 Fed. at 745. This same reasoning can be adopted to the dual officer situation.
See infra at note 86. And see Developments in the Law of Criminal Conspiracy,
72 HARv. L. REV. 920, 952-53 (1959). It is interesting to note that the facts of the
instant case would probably have sustained a charge of an unlawful agreement to
boycott, since Moore had been notified by a competitor that if Sharp continued his
undercutting of the prices then said competitor would indulge in a price cutting
campaign on his own. 173 Fed. at 741. Cf., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960).
2222 Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915).
'COMMIrrmE REPORT 31.
Ibid,
[Vol. 23,
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It is submitted that this case can not be passed over so lightly since
it is among the few which have taken a reasoned position on the problem
which was alluded to in Union Pacific Coal Company" and with which we
are here faced---.e., can a conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of
section 1 of the Sherman Act be committed by corporate officers acting
among themselves in behalf of the corporation. Since the court reached a
positive conclusion on this basic question the merits of its position should
be evaluated, rather than an effort made to pass off the result on tenuous
grounds.'
An analysis of Patterson reveals that the "brief" discussion of the
applicability of section 1 to the facts of that case were rather more pene-
trating than brief. The defendants had appealed from convictions based
upon an indictment setting forth three counts, the first of which was based
upon a conspiracy under section 1, and the second and third of which were
based upon violations of section 2.'
Contrary to the impression created by the Committee Report, the ap-
peal court upheld the first count while striking down the two counts based
upon section 2 as being improperly pleaded."' Thus the court held that
the argument complaining of the order overruling the demurrer to each
count of the indictment would be honored as to the latter two though not
as to the first.'
It is further interesting to note that "the defendants requested that
the jury be instructed to find them not guilty on the second and third
(count)."' (Emphasis added.) The court on appeal stated: "in accord-
ance with our holding as to the sufficiency of these two counts, the de-
fendants were entitled to have the jury so instructed. The first count alone
(based on section 1) should have been submitted to them.'' " As the italic-
ized portion clearly indicates, the thinking of the court in the case was so
widely assumed and accepted that even those proceeded against did not
2'Union Pacific Coal Company v. United States, 173 Fed. 737 (8th Cir. 1909), note
18 supra.
2It is conceded that the case would not be controlling and that its reasoning is not
necessarily worthy of adoption. However, it is submitted that the proper means
to avoid its implications would be through confession and avoidance and not
through denial of its position, which plainly was that there was nothing anomolous
about an intra-corporate conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
a222 Fed. at 609-10.8
"It must be held, therefore, that the first count is good." 22-92 Fed. at 617. "We see
no escaping from the conclusion that the [second] count on this ground [the fact
that the competitors whose business the defendants were alleged to be preempting
were incapable of identification] is void for uncertainty." 222 Fed. at 623. "This
brings us to the third count, and we need not spend much space upon it. It charges
that the defendant, having before the 3 years preceding the indictment, engaged in
the unlawful conspiracy described in the first count, . . . had monopolized the in-
terstate trade and commerce in cash registers .... It will be noticed that the same
uncertainty exists here [as in count two] as to the interstate trade and commerce
in cash registers secured by the National Company.... On this ground the count
is bad."
"But it is otherwise insufficient. It does not charge an offense against the
United States, i.e., the offense of monopolizing a part of interstate trade and com-
merce, and that for two'reasons .... 222 Fed. at 624 (Emphasis added.)
'"On this ground we think the [second] count is defective, and that the court
erred in overruling the demurrer thereto." 222 Fed. at 624. "It must be held,
therefore, that the third count is bad, and the lower court erred in overruling the
demurrer thereto." 222 Fed. at 626.
'222 Fed. at 649.
"Ibid.
3.962]
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consider the possibility that such a proceeding is logically beyond the
proscriptions of section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
To decide whether the court was completely unsophisticated or whether
we have become too much so we should turn to the reasoning of the court,
which, because it was not addressing itself specifically to the problem, is
scattered throughout the opinion. To begin with, as above mentioned, both
the court and the defendants assumed that a group of corporate officers
could be held guilty of a violation of section 1. The basic dispute as to
the validity of the first count revolved about the problem of which of the
1.1 specific means by which the defendants were alleged to have conspired
were sustained by the provable facts of the case.' Further topics of dis-
pute were uncertainty, duplicity, and whether the count was defective in
not alleging an offense against the United States since not alleging facts
showing that the trade and comerce conspired against was interstate.'
Hence, it is not peculiar for the court to hold simply, after disposing of
these various allegations, "that the first count is good,' without a men-
tion of the doubts which presently prevail.
Moreover, in discussing the validity of the second count, the court, in
dealing with a particular aspect of that problem, stated that :'
371t is interesting to note thnt while the trial lasted three months, resulted in
criminal sentences being pronounced on 27 of the defendants, including imprison-
ment of the president of the company for one year, and culminated in an appeal
listing 393 errors, the defendants at no point took the position that "these two trees
are one," and that for that reason the first count was not good. This may ad-
mittedly be softened by the contention that outside contracts could have been shown,
but see note 229 infra.
8'Iu this regard the court was treating the contention that the jury should have
been instructed peremptorily to find a verdict for them. The court pointed out
that in resolving this question two things must be clearly understood. "One is as
to what, under the evidence, was the case which it was open to the government to
claim should be submitted to the jury." 222 Fed. at 627. After considering this
the court stated that "the other thing which at this point should be clearly under-
-stood is whether, in order to there being such a case for submission to the jury,
it is absolutely essential that anything was done in furtherance of such conspiracy
within the 3 years preceding the indictment." 22 Fed. at 630. They conclude that
it is not, and ". . . come, then, to the question whether the government was entitled
to a submission of such case to the jury." 222 Fed. at 631. The court concluded
tht ". . . it [is] clear that there was substantial evidence to the effect that there
was a conspiracy on the part of those officers and agents of the National Company
who then had to do with competition .. " 222 Fed. at 633.87Id. at 615. These three contentions were put forth as grounds upon which a de-
murrer should have been sustained to each of the three counts. These contentions
were supplemented by other assignments of error which will be subsequently con-
sidered in developing the analysis of this court's position on intra-corporate con-
spiracy. Though the court found the second and third counts defective for one or
more of these three contentions, they felt them to be not seriously urged as to the
first count except as to that maintaining that the jurisdictional effect had not
been alleged. They held that a fair meaning of the indictment was that the busi-
ness of the competitors was interstate, and that hence the jurisdictional requisite
was furnished. It is to be noted that this case was in the era of constitutional
limitations of stringent nature on the commerce clause. For an indiction of the
vastly expanded concepts in this area see Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359
U.S. 207 (1959). However, the court itself noted "there is no act of interstate
trade or commerce so insignificant as not to be protected by it." 222 Fed. at 619.
8I8. at 617.
8'222 Fed. at 618-19. The language of the court in dealing with the question of con-
tradictory terms is understandable in the light of the recent evolvement of the
"rule of reason" as the test of violation of the Sherman Act. In United States v.
Trans-Missour! Freight Association, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), the Supreme Court had
seemingly taken a position that would have emasculated the flow of commerce.
The Court stated, in reply to a contention that the Act should be so read as to cover
[Vol. 23,
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It should be approached through the first section. It is now settled
that that section covers those contracts, combinations, and con-
spiracies only which are unreasonably in restraint of interstate
trade or commerce. Possibly every conspiracy in restraint thereof
is unreasonably so. This is on the idea that there is no such thing
as a reasonable conspiracy, or a conspiracy to do a reasonable
thing. It is a contradiction in terms. The secti6n includes con-
spiracies between competitors, or behween the officers and agents
of a competitor on its behalf against a competitor. But it is not
limited to such conspiracies. It includes also conspiracies between
any persons, whoever they may be, against any other person ...
It is not essential that the execution of the conspiracy be of any
benefit to the conspirators. It is sufficient that it will be in re-
straint of another's interstate trade or commerce .... Clearly, then,
a conspiracy between the officers and agents of one competitor on
its behalf in restraint of a single interstate sale ar shipment of
another competitor is covered by it. (Emphasis added.)
In continuing its treatment of the section 2 count, the court pointed
to the observation of Chief Justice White that monopolizing was a species
of restraint of trade so that a combination or conspiracy to monopolize
only those acts which are in unreasonable restraint of trade, that "the term is not
of such limited signification .... When, . . . the body of an act pronounces as illegal
every contract or combination in restraint of trade . . . the plain and ordinary
meaning of such language is not limited to that kind of contract alone which is in
reasonable restraint of trade, but all contracts are included in such language, and
no exception or limitation can be added without placing in the act that which has
been omitted by Congress." 166 U.S. at 328. That four members of the Court saw
the impractical effect of the above position is exemplified by their dissent written
by Justice White, wherein it is asserted: "It is, I submit, not to be doubted that
the interpretation of the words 'every contract in restraint of trade', so as to em-
brace within its purview every contract, however reasonable, would certainly work
an enormous injjustice and operate to the undue restraint of the liberties of the
citizen. But there is no canon of interpretation which requires that the letter be
followed, when by so doing an unreasonable result is accomplished. On the con-
trary, the rule is the other way, andi exacts that the spirit which vivifies, and not
the letter which killeth, is the proper guide by which to correctly interpret a
statute." 166 U.S. at 354. That Justice Peckham, who wrote the majority opinion,
may have at least felt that he had been unduly castigated is shown by a later
opinion wherein he states: "To suppose, as is assumed by counsel, that the effect
of the decision in the Traiis-Missouri case is to render illegal most business con-
tracts or combinations, however indispensible and necessary they may be, because,
as they assert, they all restrain trade in some remote and indirect degree, is to
make a most violent assumption, and one not called for or justified by the decision
mentioned, or by any other decision of this court." United States v. Joint Traffic
Association, 171 U.S. 505, 568 (1898). Doubts as to the Court's stand were resolved
in Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Chief
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated: ". . . it inevitably -follows that the
provision necessarily called for the exercise of judgment which required that some
standard should be resorted to for the purpose of determining whether the prohibi-
tions contained in the statute had -or had not in any given case been violated. Thus
not specifying but indubitably contemplating and requiring a standard, it follows
that it was intended that the standard of reason which had been applied at the
common law and in this country in dealing with subjects of the character embraced
by the statute, was intended to be the measure used for the purpose of determining
whether in a given case a particular act had or had not brought about the wrong
against which the statute provided." 221 U.S. at 00. Hence, though the Patterson
court recognized that only unreasonable restraints are condemned it was bothered
by the possibility that any conspiracy may be said to be unreasonable. However,
as developed in the course of this article, it is submitted that this is to assume the
matter in issue.
1962]
8
Montana Law Review, Vol. 23 [1961], Iss. 2, Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol23/iss2/2
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
would violate both sections.0 In the instant case the pleadings themselves
were defective in alleging section 2 violations, hence necessitating reliance
upon the count charging violation of section 1. The fact that the object
of the conspiracy was monopolization is unimportant in the view of the
court, which assumes, together with the defendants, that corporate officers
can violate the conspiracy portion of section 1 of the Act."
In addition to the action of the court in upholding the order denying
defendants' demurrer to the first count, the jury direction asked by the
defendants, and the language of the court in treating the second and third
counts, the treatment by the court of the other assignments of error is
replete with an assumption of the validity of a conspiracy charge against
corporate officers for intra-corporate conduct. In direct refutation of the
position taken by the Committee Report, the court stated that ". . . we
limit the case which was open for the government to claim . . . to whether
the defendants (being the officers of the corporation) . . . conspired in
restraint of ... trade. . . ."" The contention of the defendants was limited
to the claim that only those officers who had to do with competition could
lie guilty of the conspiracy.3 Throughout the course of the many assign-
ments based upon the relevancy of admitted evidence the court assumes
the validity of the conspiracy count."
'222 Fed. at 620, citing Standard Oil Company v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31
(1911). As pointed out in note 7 supra, the suggestion has been made that the find-
ing of a conspiracy under section 2 should create less of a conceptual problem than
finding one under section 1, when only the officers of a single corporation are in-
volved. This distinction hinges upon the contention that while section 2 makes
monopolizing a substantive offense, section 1 does not make restraining trade a
substantive offense, but only condemns the means by which it may be restrained.
See note 284 infra.
"Though the first count was based upon a section 1 violation, it is readily apparent
that the conspiracy had as its object the monopolization of the interstate trade in
cash registers. That this would make some difference is supported to a certain
extent by the following language of Justice White in the Standard Oil case: "In
other words, having by the first section forbidden all means of monopolizing trade,
that is, unduly restraining it by means of every contract, combination, etc., [con-
spiracy] the second section seeks, if possible, to make the prohibitions of the act
all the more complete and perfect by embracing all attempts to reach the end pro-
hibited by the first section, that is, restraints of trade, by any attempt to mono-
polize, or monopolization thereof, even although the acts by which such results are
attempted to be brought about or are brought about be not embraced within the
general enumeration of the first section." 221 U.S. at 61. Thus the contention
could be made that the acts which are not within the general enumeration of see-
tion 1, are available in section 2, and that the results of Patterson are palatable
because the section 2 charge was there in substance, if not in form, since the point
on which the court sustained the demurrer was admitted to be "somewhat tech-
nical." 222 Fed. at 623. Yet the fact that a proceeding is barred by way of section
2 because of a technicality, would be little reason for permitting it to be brought
about by an application of section 1 which was unjustified on its facts. This would
indeed be "straining at a gnat and swallowing a camel."
42222 Fed. at 629.
""In order for the defendants to have so conspired it is essential that they had such
connection with the National Company that in the performance of their duties they
had to do with its competitors. Those of its officers and agents who had nothing
to do with competition, as, for instance, those in the manufacturing department,
cannot be said to have so conspired. It is not sufficient to connect any officer or
agent of the National Company with the conspiracy that they knew of it or
acquiesced in it. They must by word or deed have became a party to it." 222
Fed. at 631.
"E.g., "But even on the basis that the foregoing list exhausts all acts in restraint
of the trade ... still we are constrained to hold that it was for the jury to deter-
mine whether the conspiracy continued .... 222 Fed. at 638. (Emphasis added.)
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Further, in treating the issue of exclusion of evidence," the court, in
dealing with the topic of patent validity, held that: "The only possible
ground for its admissibility was to make good that defendants had the right
to conspire in restraint of the interstate trade . . . and hence were not
guilty of an offense under first section of the Anti-Trust Act in so doing."'
The court continued:"
This brings before us the question whether . . . the officers and
agents of a patentee, can conspire in restraint of the interstate
trade or commerce in the article covered by the patent of persons
who have no right to engage in such trade and commerce, and who
by engaging therein infringe the right of the patentee....
In answer to this question the court, after considering the common law and
statutory rights of a patentee, stated :'
We are not concerned here with the question as to what a patentee
may himself do in a general way to protect the substantive right
which he has from invasion. The question in hand is whether he
and another, or his officers and agents in his interest, may conspire
to prevent an invasion of his rights in the interstate field by the
use of any such means. This depends solely on whether such a
conspiracy is within the first section of the Anti-Trust Act. And
it would seem that to ask this question is to answer it. The terms
of the section are of a most sweeping character. It includes every
conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade or commerce. It is
not a question whether it is rightful or wrongful interstate trade
or commerce that is covered by the conspiracy. It is sufficient
that it is interstate trade or commerce. If two or more persons
in no way interested in a patent were to conspire in restraint of
the interstate trade or commerce of an infringer, no one could
contend that the conspiracy was not covered by the statute. No
more is it open to contend that a conspiracy by a patentee and
another, or by the officers and agents of a patentee in his interest,
to restrain the interstate trade or commerce of an infringer, is not
within the statute. The intent of the statute was to sweep away
all conspiracies . . . whatever their character may be. (Emphasis
added.)
Again the court's language is interesting not for its views on the
relationships of patent law and anti-trust, but rather for its apparent a
' The treatment of this issue is contained at 222 Fed. at 639-49.
"Id. at 645. The court had earlier dealt with the contention that the case of Virtue
v. Creamery Packing Company, 227 U.S. 8 (1913) had indicated that a patent would
insulate defendants from attack under section 1. It noted that: "He (Justice Mc-
Kenna) did not mean by that that no recovery could be had under that act for dam-
ages caused by a conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade by the malicious
prosecution of suits for infringement. He meant no more than that it did not ap-
pear that there was any such conspiracy in that case. So far as appeared, both
suits were brought in good faith.
But here there was evidence tending to show that suits were not brought in
good faith, and, on the contrary, were an 'illicit use of the courts as instrumentali-
ties of oppression.'" 222 Fed. at 643. If the instigation of malicious prosecution
suits should be held to be an unreasonable restraint of trade the result should
scarcely depend upon whether house or independent counsel were employed in the
operation.
222 Fed. at 645.
'
8Id. at 646.
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priori assumption that officers and agents acting in behalf of their cor-
poration can be held under the conspiracy phrase of section 1. This view
of the court is further exemplified in their final treatment of instructions
requested by defendants as to what it was lawful for them as agents of the
company to do."
The above analysis of the Patterson case indicates that the cavalier
manner in which the Attorney General's National Committee brushed it
aside is not befitting of the apparent general acceptance in the year 1915
of the proposition that intra-corporate conduct could constitute a con-
spiracy in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Subsequent cases will
now be considered in an effort to determine whether this basic assumption
has been altered, and if so, upon what rationale the alteration is based.
A subsequent case which at first blush would appear to refute the im-
plicit holding and profuse dicta of the Patterson case and its precursor,
the Union Pacific case, is Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation.'
Here, a private action was brought against a corporation under section 4
of the Clayton Act to recover treble damages for violation of the anti-
trust lawsY A demurrer was sustained to the declaration on the ground
that the alleged conspiracy was not shown to affect interstate commerce,
that "public interests were not involved, as required in the case of a valid
suit under the Sherman Act," and that the declaration was duplicitous.'
Upon amendment of the complaint, the court was faced with a com-
plaint which charged that wrongful acts had been committed in that the
defendant corporation had conspired "with one of its officers and two of
its general sales managers ... to force the plaintiff out of . . . business in
"The defendants had requested that the jury be charged that it was not unlawful
for them to have required their agents to report the names of persons who had
purchased machines from competitors, and to secure samples of competitors ma-
chines; to sell machines to parties who had purchased competitors machines by
making exchange offers; and to make comparative demonstrations of the merits of
their machines. The court stated that: "No objection can be made to the last prop-
osition, but the other two are too broad. They need qualification. It was unlawful
for defendants to do as stated in the second proposition, if the doing thereof in-
tolved the purchaser and owner of the competing cash register breaking his con-
tract with the competitor in any particular, or was done for the purpose of driving
the competitor out of the cash register field .. "
"Then, as to reporting purchasers of competing registers and securing samples,
it all depends on the manner in which the information in the one instance and the
samples in the other were obtained or secured. If in a proper manner, nothing un-
lawful was done." 222 Fed. at 650. (Emphasis added.)
"26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1038).
""Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
States in the district in which the defendant resides, or is found, or has an agent,
without respect to the amount in controversy and shall recover threefold the dam-
ages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1958).
"26 F. Supp. at 826. The original complaint had alleged violations of both the Sher-
man Act and of section 2 of the Clayton Act (price discrimination). 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1958). However, the declaration under section 2 of the Clayton Act was
framed under the pre-1936 Robinson-Patman Act amendment in 49 Stat. 1926
(1936). "Taken as a whole, the declaration discloses only what seems to be a
private controversy rather than one affecting the public as such. It is well estab-
lished that the principal purpose in enacting the Antitrust Laws ... was to protect
the public; and the right of an individual to sue for personal damages sustained
is incidental and subordinate." 26 F. Supp. at 825. And see note 96 infra for
further comment on the attitude of the courts as to private action suits.
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the defendant's . . .products. . . .'"' The specific facts alleged were that
defendant corporation had demanded that plaintiff either buy the business
of a competitor or sell his business to said competitor. Upon his refusal to
do either, defendant corporation refused to sell further goods to plaintiff
at a dealer's discount." The court, in assuming that such action of the
defendant was arbitrary and unreasonable, nonetheless held that "nothing
more appears in the present amended declaration than in substance ap-
peared in the original declaration. . . . Essentially what is complained of
is a private wrong or common law tort in which the public interest is not
involved.... The Sherman Act is, therefore, clearly not really involved."'
However, after dealing with the problem as to whether the conduct
involved was violative of the Act by its nature, the court dealt briefly with
the means by which it was accomplished. In pointing out that there was
no combination or conspiracy alleged between two or more manufacturers
the court seemingly implied that there could be no such conspiracy as was
anticipated in the Patterson case.' Yet it is uncertain whether this observa-
tion was based upon such a supposition, or whether it merely recognized
that the nature of the conduct would thereby be altered to create the sub-
stantive offense. But the position of the court is clarified when, after
pointing out that the conspiracy involved a rather unusual group, that
the agents had not been joined and that no motives had actuated the agents,
it asserts that : '
If they had improper personal motives and combined to carry them
out through the medium of the defendant corporation to the pre-
judice of the plaintiff, it is conceivable that a common law tort suit
might lie against them; but it is difficult to see how that would
constitute either restraint of trade or monopoly of trade an the
part of the defendant corporation. (Emphasis added.)
Although it appears that the language could be taken to mean that
officers can not be held liable for a conspiracy it should be borne in mind
that the language should be limited to the facts of the case. As seen above
it is apparent that the court, though failing to clearly distinguish between
'26 F. Supp. at 827. Interestingly enough, the declaration also contained counts
based on the attempt and monopolization portions of section 2 and section 2 of the
Clayton Act. Concededly the court was convinced that there was no unreasonable
cvnduct involved in the case, or those sections could have been facilitated.
5426 F. Supp. at 827.
"Id. at 828. The court said that "it is legally quite impossible to understand how
the public interest could be concerned in this individual private controversy. There
is nothing in the alleged facts to show that the motive of the defendant was to
restrain trade or to lesson competition and certainly nothing to show that the
alleged unreasonable demand on the plaintiff could possible have the effect of
lessening competition, or of raising prices or even maintaining prices." Ibid. (Em-
phasis added). But compare the language of Justice Black in Klor's Inc. v. Broad-
way-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959), wherein he stated that conduct "is not
to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose business is so
small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy."
""The conspirators here named are a rather unusual group with respect to restraint
or monopoly of trade as the conspiracy was said to be between the defendant cor-
poration and its agents, and one Carpel, another local retail dealer." 26 F. Supp.
at 829. Obviously, if the conduct had been sufficiently aggravated, the presence
of the "outsider" would have satisfied the requirement of duality.
"26 F. Supp. at 830.
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the two, indicated that an unreasonable restraint had not been imposed.'
Further, the action was against the defendant corporation rather than
against the individual officers. As discussed infra this may make a dif-
ference in the ultimate outcome on conceptual distinctions.'
White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp.' was the second case
which the Attorney General's Committee dismissed as being sustainable
upon grounds other than Section 1. This position would appear either to
understate the case, as with Patterson, or to overstate the case, depending
upon one's interpretation of the result. Thus the Committee's statement,
that "despite the holding in . . . White Bear under Section 1, plaintiffs
... charged violations of Section 2, thus making unnecessary to the result
the brief discussion of the applicability of section 1 to these facts'"' seems
to be based upon an error of generalization, if not of fact.
The only holding under section 1 was that that section would not be
considered. The court, pointing out that the plaintiff relied upon section
1 as well as section 2 stated that in the view they took of the case "it is
unnecessary to engage in a separate discussion of -this provision. '
Hence, there was no holding or discussion in White Bear as to the ap-
plicability of section 1 to a conspiracy involving the conduct of officers of
a corporation acting in its behalf. In this sense it would appear that the
Committee Report overstated the case. Since no section 1 question was
dealt with it need not be explained away to support a contention that
section 1 is not violated by intra-corporate conduct.
However, the case may be understated in that the court considered the
question to be "whether the monopoly, which plaintiffs' evidence showed
that defendants had conspired and attempted to establish, was one which
fell within the operation of section 2 of the Sherman Act." (Emphasis
added.) If it is recalled that the conspiracy portion of section 2 raises
the same problems as to intra-corporate activity as does section 1, it becomes
apparent that the court's interpretation of the question under section 2
involves the same problems as though it were considered under section 1."
In fact, in stating that it would be unnecessary to consider the section 1
charge, he court stressed that "the two sections overlap in the sense that a
monopoly under Section 2 is a species of restraint of trade under Section 1.'
""There is nothing in the single set of facts here alleged from which there could be
any reasonable inference that the defendant corporation was endeavoring to re-
strain or monopolize trade in these products." 26 F. Supp. at 830. And see note
55 supra, where the court expressly finds that neither motive nor effect were
present in this case. "The question of the application of the [Sherman Act] is one
of intent and effect." Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 361(1933).
OBut see note 161 infra.
1129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942).
6 0o0mMITTEE REPORT 31.
' 12 9 F.2d at 602 n.3. The trial court had directed a verdict for defendant after
plaintiff's evidence on the ground that the "public interest" had not been shown.
129 F.2d at 602.
Id. at 602. That is, the plaintiff based his claim under section 2 on both the
conspiracy and the attempt provision.
'The court itself observes that "Section 1, of course, embodies a legally distinct
wrong or offense from § 2, but 'the two sections overlap in the sense that a mono.
poly under § 2 is a species of restraint of trade under § 1.' United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil 310 U.S. 150, 226 footnote 59." 129 F.2d at 602 n.3.
65Ibid.
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Concededly, the court was considering not only a conspiracy charge
but an attempt charge as well. Beyond a doubt, the reversal of the lower
court's directed verdict for the defendant could be justified upon the ground
that a monopoly had been attempted, which does not require a plurality of
actors. Yet, a consideration of the language of the case clearly indicates
that the defendants, being a single corporation and the owner and officers
thereof, were considered by the court as being legally capable of conspiring
to monopolize. Thus the court stated that "on plaintiffs evidence, there
was a conspiracy and an attempt to monopolize the 'first-run' films of the
interstate market. . . .'" Also "while plaintiffs evidence of conspiracy
clearly was sufficient to go to the jury as against defendants State Theatre
Corporation, Jensen and Albrecht, it is doubtful if it sufficiently showed
joinder or participation in the conspiracy or attempted monopoly by de-
fendant Naas, who appears to have been wholly inactive in the business.'
,Emphasis added.)
The holding of the court, then, was not based upon section 1 at all,
but was based upon both the conspiracy and attempt aspects of section 2.
Even though it be conceded that the attempt charge alone would have been
sufficient it is equally apparent that in the eyes of the court the conspiracy
charge likewise would have been sufficient unto itself. Since the court
made no effort to separate the two elements and the defendants apparently
failed to plead the single corporate entity defense, there seems little justi-
fication to reject one leg of the courts holding merely because another leg
would sustain the result.'
In the cases previously considered the direct question as to whether
intra-corporate conduct could violate section 1 of the Sherman Act was not
passed upon. Yet, in some at least, there seemed to be an underlying as-
sumption that such a violation was possible.' In United States v. Lorain
Journal Co.," the question was squarely presented to the court. A civil
action was filed against defendant corporation and several officers of that
corporation seeking to enjoin them from continuing to engage in certain
acts in furtherance of an alleged combination and conspiracy in restraint
of trade violative of section 1, and an alleged conspiracy and attempt to
monopolize in violation of section 2, of the Sherman Act.' The district
court, unlike the White Bear court, separated the attempt and conspiracy
'129 F.2d at 604 (Emphasis supplied.)
'Id. at 606. And compare the similar position taken by the Patterson court as set
forth in note 43 supra, as to the non-liability on the part of those inactive members
of the corporation.
8The court did state that: "The attempts of defendants to monopolize the 'first-
run' films in commerce, for the purpose of putting plaintiff out of the motion pic-
ture theatre business at White Bear Lake, must consequently, on plaintiff's evi-
dence, be held to have presented a case for the jury, under the Sherman Act."
129 F.2d at 605. Though having reached this result made it unnecessary to care-
fully consider the charge as to conspiracy, the fact that it was considered indicates
that it was thought to have posed no special problem once it was decided that the
conduct complained of was carried out with the "intent" of driving the plaintiff
out of business and with the "effect" of depriving the population of White Bear
of the opportunity to see a substantial number of films.
'E.g., Patterson v. United States, 2,22 Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915).
7092 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
"Id. at 795-96. This action was based upon section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1958) which gives power to the district courts to enjoin conduct violating the
antitrust laws.
1962]
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aspects of the section 2 charge and found that the defendants had attempted
to monopolize in spite of their contention that interstate commerce was not
involved.'
As to the charges dealing with conspiracy the court held that :
The remaining charges of conspiracy to restrain and to monopolize
pose a problem to which a great deal of attention has been devoted
by both the Government and defendants: namely, whether a con-
spiracy within the meaning of the Sherman Act can be found to
exist between and among a single corporation and the officers and
employees who act for it. For the defendants argue that the "con-
spiracy" here is the formulation of business policy for a single
enterprise. (Emphasis added.)
After pointing out that the problem is not presented in connection with the
attempted monopolization, the court set forth the arguments of the respec-
tive parties.
The defendants asserted that the individual corporation has at its dis-
posal only so much strength, which remains the same whether it is exercised
by one or more officers. And furthermore "the conspiracy sections of the
Sherman Act were designed to strike only at those situations where the
economic power exerted has been enhanced by a confederacy of otherwise
independent business enterprises and not where coercive restraints are at-
tempted or accomplished by a so-called 'single trader.' ....
In opposition to the position of the defendant, the government asserted
that the language of the Sherman Act should receive as liberal an inter-
pretation as had other conspiracy statutes, and that the cases stressed the
character of the restraint rather than the economic relaionships of "the of-
fending conspirators.' "
Pointing out that the monopoly attempt was proscribed by the Sher-
man Act, the court disposed of a difficult problem as follows :"6
The relief to be granted for that violation of law should terminate
all the abuses in which the defendants indulged. This renders the
solution of the controversy in respect of the charges of conspiracy
of mere academic interest, and make its determination unnecessary
in this instance. (Emphasis added.)
On appeal to the Supreme Court,' that body pointed out that the com-
plaint had alleged that defendant corporation and four of its officers were
engaged in a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade and to mono-
polize as well as attempting to monopolize. The intra-corporate problem
was but alluded to in their statement that the district court had found the
""The defendants do not in effect deny that they have attempted to monopolize, but
they seek to avoid the ban of the Sherman Act on the ground that only a local
monopoly and not a monopoly of interstate commerce was sought." 92 F. Supp. at
798. But the court stated that: "Local monopolies are proscribed by the Act where
they are achieved or sought by restraint of interstate commerce." Ibid.
"92 F. Supp. at 799.
"Id. at 800.
'"Ibid.
"Inbid.
"Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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parties guilty of an attempt to monopolize and had "confin[ed] itself to
that issue. "'8
In United States v. Times-Picayune,'9 the government again brought an
action against a corporation and four of its officers alleging that :'
a) the defendant corporation had entered into contracts with ad-
vertisers which violated Section 1 of the Act;
b) the defendants were combining and conspiring in unreasonable
restraint of trade in violation of Section 1; and
c) the defendants were combining and conspiring to monopolize
and attempting to monopolize in violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
For reasons not set forth by the court, but which may be apparent to
clear thinkers such as those composing the Attorney General's National
Committee, the government, in its brief filed after trial, urged only that
the defendants had contracted in restraint of trade and attempted to create
a monopoly. "The allegations that defendants conspired among them-
selves in violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act were not urged, and must
be considered as having been abandoned."' On appeal to the Supreme
Court by defendants, who were found guilty of the contract and attempt
charges, a limited consideration was made to the intra-corporate conspiracy
problem.'
Perhaps the case which takes the most stringent view against the pos-
sibility of an intra-corporate conspiracy is Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc.' An action was brought against Motorola to recover treble
damages for violation of the anti-trust laws. Plaintiff's amended complaint
alleged that defendant had terminated plaintiff's distributorship with de-
fendant because of plaintiff's refusal to agree to certain conditions. While
plaintiff's agreement included the right to sell much of Motorola's equip-
ment, it did not include the right to sell communications equipment. Mo-
torola refused to grant plaintiff the latter right and further informed plain-
tiff that his continued selling of such equipment obtained from other sources
would result in a non-renewal of his contract. Such an eventuality resulted
IsId. at 145.
"105 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La. 1952).T Id. at 671-72.
"Id. at 672.
'Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). After deter-
mining that neither the effects nor the aim of monopoly had been established and
that acordingly the judgment must be reversed unless other factors could bring the
case within the proscribed areas, the Court stated: "Colgate's principle protects
the Times-Picayune Publishing Company's simple refusal to sell advertising space
in the Times-Picayune or States separately unless other factors destroy the limited
dispensation which that case confers.
"In our view, however, no additional circumstances bring this case within § 1.
Though operating two constituent newspapers, the Times-Picayune is a single cor-
poration, and the Governnent in the District Court abandoned a charge of unlaw-
ful concert among the corporate officers. With the advertising contracts in this
proceeding viewed as in themselves lawful and no further elements of combination
apparent in the case, § 2 criteria must become dispositive here." 345 U.S. at 626.
As to what additional elements may suffice to bring the case within section 1, see
Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) and
note 287 infra.
"200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
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and the plaiantiff alleged inter alia that the defendant and certain of its
officers had engaged in a conspiracy in violations of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act.'
In sustaining a dismissal of the complaint as failing to state a cause
of action, the majority first asserted that in pleading a conspiracy a general
allegation is but an allegation of a legal conclusion, and that to state a
cause of action a statement of the facts constituting the conspiracy to re-
strain trade must be set forth.' But the court further asserted that a "more
fundamental defect" was present :'
It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons
or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire
with itself any more than a private individual can, and it is the
general rule that the acts of the agent are the acts of the corpora-
tion. Here it is alleged that the conspiracy existed between the de-
fendant corporation [and certain officers] who have been actively
engaged in the management, direction and control of the affairs
and business of defendant. This is certainly a vnique group of
conspirators. T~he officers, agents and employees are not named
as defendants and no explanation is given of their non-joinder.
Nor is it alleged affirmatively, expressly or otherwise, that these
[individuals] were actuated by any motives personal to themselves.
Obviously they were acting only for the defendant corporation.
(Emphasis added.)
After discussing certain situations where a corporation may be held
liable (and which have been or will be discussed)' the court continues by
stating that :8'
. . . it appears plain to us that the conspiracy upon which the plain-
tiff relies consists simply in the absurd assertion that the defend-
ant, through its officers and agents, conspired with itself to re-
strain its trade in its own products.
The court then correctly points out that official determination of the
price, quantity and quality of goods and the type of customers or market to
be served :'
aId. at 913. The nexus of the charge was that defendants had advised the plaintiff
that they would refuse to sell to him if he sold the goods of others, and that they
did so refuse when he went against their wishes.
'200 F.2d at 913-14. Clearly, on the facts alleged, this case would satisfy the Colgate
principle as enunciated in note 82 supra.200 F.2d at 914.87E.g., "And of course, a corporation and its subsidiaries can be guilty of a con-
spiracy in restraint of trade but that involves separate corporated entitles." Ibid.
8"200 F.2d at 214.
'Ibid. However, it should be noted that the concept of "rights" is not absolute. If
the officers are causing the corporation to go beyond its rights, a different question
is presented, and it is submitted that the corporation goes beyond its rights when
it attempts to unreasonably restrain trade. "But the word 'right' is one of the most
deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning in the premise
to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified." American
Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Reserve Bank, 256 U.S. 350, 358 (1921). To say that
anything which it can do within its corporate shell is not an unreasonable restraint
of trade would be to make'a rather large assumption; but better that such an as-
sumption be indulged than that even. assuming unreasonable conduct the courts are
powerless to prevent it because of a conceptual difficulty. See Beacon Fruit &
Produce Co. v. Harris & Co., 152 F. Supp. 702 (D. Mass. 1957), discussed at notes
124 and 176 infra, which points out one possible exception to the Nelson "rule."
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* . do not result in the corporation being engaged in a conspiracy
in unlawful restraint of trade under the Sherman Act. Plaintiff
can come within the meaning of section 1 of the Act only by claim-
ing the existence of a conspiracy but no conspiracy could possibly
exist under the facts disclosed. The Acts does not purport to cover
a conspiracy which consists merely in the fact that the officers of
the single defendant corporation did their day to day jobs in
formulating and carrying out its managerial policy .... It does not
violate the Act when it exercises its rights through its officers and
agents, which is the only medium through which it can possibly
act. (Emphasis added.)
In continuing, the court made the astute observation that the plaintiff
in naming the officers was trying to avail itself of the doctrine that what
is not illegal for a corporation to do alone becomes illegal if done as part
of a conspiracy. ' This attempt is thwarted by a citation from Kraft-Phenix'
which is as vague out of context as it was in its original setting.' Finally,
"in the absence of any allegation whatever to indicate that the agents of
the corporation were acting in other than their normal capacities, plaintiff
has failed to state a cause of action based on conspiracy under Section 1
of the Act.'
In addition to the allegations based upon section 1 of the Sherman
Act, the plaintiff alleged violations of section 3 of the Clayton Act." Be-
fore dealing with the treatment of the issues by the dissenting judge, it
should be clear that the apparent ground upon which the majority rejected
the section 3 claim was that that section covers only leases, sales, or con-
tracts actually made on the prohibited conditions. In the instant case it
was the absence of a contract which was being complained of.'
Hence it would appear that Judge Rives's dissent is aimed at the ac-
ceptance of the intra-corporate defense rather than the technical defense
against the alleged Clayton Act violation. Thus he asserts that a scheme
has been devised by which defendant's dealers have been coerced into en-
tering into contracts in restraint of trade in clear violation of section 3 of
the Clayton Act." Since plaintiff is a stranger to these contracts he cannot
01But this leaves unanswered the question of whether the conduct of the corporation
is legal. It might also be said that the plaintiffs were simply hopeful of striking
down what they considered to be an unreasonable restraint of trade by a means
which the Congress had provided.91Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation, 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1937), dis-
cussed at note 50, supra.
"Judge Chesnut had therein stated that "... the inclusion of the defendant's agents
in the alleged conspiracy would seem to be only the basis for a technical rather
than a substantial charge of conspiracy because obviously the agents were acting
only for the defendant corporation." 26 F. Supp. at 830, cited by the instant court
at 200 F.2d at 914.
9"200 F.2d at 914. What result if they had been acting in other than their "normal
capacities"? See note 155, infra.
-15 U.S.C. § 14 (1958). This section condemns tying restrictions and exclusive
arrangements under stated circumstances.
'200 F.2d at 915. "It is the absence of a contract with the plaintiff, not the presence
of agreemnts with distributors in other parts of the country, of which the plaintiff
must complain." Ibid. "There is a real difference between the act of refusing to
deal and the execution of a contract which prevents a person from dealing with
another." 200 F.2d at 915-16.
"Ibid. If plaintiff had signed the requested agreement there would seem to be little
doubt that a violation of section 3 could be found. Compare Standard Oil Com-
pany v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949). Though it may seem that this same
1962]
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recover since not affected and he can not recover under section 1 of the
Sherman Act because ". . . the scheme was concocted under the cloak of
immunity of a single corporate entity. At long last a method has been
found to flout the purposes of the anti-trust laws and to deny the victims
any recourse to the courts. I cannot agree.' ''
Implicit in Rives's dissent is the concept that the defendant and its
officers by entering into contracts in restraint of trade are likewise con-
spiring in restraint of trade and so should be reached under section 1 of
the Sherman Act if the restraint is found to be unreasonable.' As he
states:"
It seems to me that whether the functions are performed by separ-
ate corporations or by a single entity is purely a matter of con-
venience to be exercised under state law and that the incidence and
effect of the federal anti-trust laws should be the same no matter
what form the transactions take.
The persuasiveness of the majority in Nelson is demonstrated by cases
subsequently decided. For instance, in Marion County Co-op Ass'n v. Car-
'nation Company,' it was alleged that defendant corporation violated sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by maintaining a plan and scheme to
maintain a "fictitious" price for milk. The court felt -that the defendant's
contention that the complaint did not state a cause of action within section
1 or the conspiracy portion of section 2 was well founded.'
In striking down the contention of plaintiff that there may be a con-
spiracy between the officers and agents of a corporation and the corpora-
tion itself, the court stated that "the cases uniformly hold that a conspiracy
cannot exist between a corporation and its officers and agents. Perhaps
the clearest holding on this point is the case of Nelson. . . ."' Quoting
much of the language from the Nelson case as well as that of Justice Jack-
son's dissent in'the Timken' case and citing many cases not pertinent to
the point'" the court concluded that :"
violation existed because of the presence of such contracts in the agreements with
other dealers, the courts have shown an apparent reluctance to permit a private
party to maintain an action even though there has been a public wrong. See e.g.,
Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13 (3rd Cir. 1956). And see Goldlawr, Inc., v.
Schubert, 169 F. Supp. 677, 691 (1958).
'200 F.2d at 916.
"Judge Rives cites the following language from the opinion of Chief Justice White
in United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 180 (1910) : "All the diffi-
culties suggested because of the mere form in which the assailed transactions are
clothed become of no moment. This follows because ... the generic designation of
the 1st and 2nd sections of the law, when taken together embraced every conceiv-
able act which could possibly come within the spirit or purpose of the prohibitions
of the law, without regard to the garb in which such acts were clothed."
" F.2d at 916.
"0114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark. 1953).
"
'Id. at 61.
'0id. at 62.
"Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, O06 (1951). See note
257.infra and accompanying text.
'0E.g., the Times-Picayune and Lorain Journal cases, discussed supra notes 78 and 82.1
"Again the language of this court, as the Nelson court, falls from the general pro-
scription to a qualified holding. Here the court had previously stated that "the
cases uniformly hold that a conspiracy cannot exist between a corporation and its
officers and agents." 114 F. Supp. at 62. (Emphasis added.) No case cited has so
held, in spite of language to that effect.
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The above quoted authorities completely refute plaintiffs' conten-
tion and establish beyond doubt the principle that a violation of
section 1 and the conspiracy portion of section 2 of the Sherman
Act cannot be committed by a corporation and its officers and
agents when said officers and agents are acting for the corporation
in the ordinary scope of their duties. (Emphasis added.)
The court then concluded that the plaintiff made no intimation that
the officers were acting in other than their normal capacities. Since the
court ultimately found that "the defendant . . . has shown conclusively
that defendant's payments for raw milk were substantially the same as
its competitors in the area,"" it is indeed true that the officers were acting
in their normal capacities. Whether the plaintiff had intimated they were
not is open to question.
On appeal from the granting of a summary judgment for defendant,"'
the court noted that the plaintiff, in his Statement of Points, assigned as
error the district court's ruling on the intra-corporate conspiracy aspect of
the case. However, they concluded that plaintiff had abandoned the point
since appellant's brief stated :'
We do not perceive the necessity of briefing the conspiracy theory
of our Complaint for the reason that if the ruling of the District
Court were set aside by this Court, the ultimate relief that would
be obtained by the appellant would be the same whether the com-
plaint is predicated on Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act or
Section 2 alone.
Here we have a reflection of the caution which may have prompted
government counsel in the Times-Picayune case.' Reserving the question
as to whether this is the only sane course to pursue, it should at least be
noted that the rationale of counsel in the instant case is only partially justi-
fied. It is true that if the appeal failed to establish the fact that a "ficti-
tious" price had been established, as was in fact the case, the question as to
the intra-corporate problem would have been moot since no unreasonable
restraint of trade would have existed.'  However, if they had prevailed
upon this point and in fact a fictitious price had been established, it is
possible that even though a monopoly or an attempt to monopolize could
not be found, yet an unreasonable restraint of trade could be found if the
intra-corporate defense were not to prevail."'
In Brehm v. Goebel Brewing Company," the defendant entered a mo-
tion to strike designated parts from the complaint. Among these was the
third sentence of the eleventh paragraph which read :'
The officers and employees of defendant conspired to bring about
cancellation of all written contracts of distributorship and also con-
'16114 F. Supp. at 68.
"0 Marion County Cooperative Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 214 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1954).
1"Id. at 559.
'0Supra at note 81.
"OThat is, the parties would have been operating within their "rights," and hence pro-
tected by the fact limited holding of the Nelson case.
' Cf., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., 310 U.S. 150, 226 n.59 (1940).
"'Trade Cases 67,431 (W.D. Mich. 1953).
'1953 Trade Cases at 08,161.
1962]
20
Montana Law eview, Vol. 23 [1961], Iss. 2, rt. 2
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol23/iss2/2
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
spired to compel and coerce licensees and distributors having writ-
ten distributorship contracts and oral contracts from only whole-
saling beers that were not competitors ...
In sustaining the defendant's motion to strike the allegation, the court
stated :114
I think it is clear that officers and employees of the defendant cor-
poration could not conspire with themselves. If the acts of such
officers and employees were within the scope of their employment,
their acts and doings would be those of the corporation, and, of
course, if their acts and doings were outside of the scope of their
employment, the defendant corporation would not be bound. (Em-
phasis added.)
The defendant also moved that the contention that "the defendant, its
officers and agents, have conspired among themselves to bring about the
cancellation of all written distributor contracts" be stricken. 5 In dealing
with this motion the court reiterated that the acts of the officers within the
scope of their duty would be the acts of the corporation, and "it is, of
course, elemental that the defendant could not conspire with itself."' But
recognizing that the word "agents" probably referred to the distributing
agents of defendant's products, the court struck only the words "its offi-
cers. "'
Another case which relied upon Nelson is Goldlawr, Inc. v. Schubert'
involving the dismissal of a third party complaint which alleged that one
Goldman had conspired with his corporation, Goldman Theatres Inc., in
violation of the antitrust laws, to prevent plaintiff from showing first-run
movies. The complaint was dismissed on the ground that Goldman could
"not conspire with itself, i.e., its officers, agents, and employees."' The
appellant, citing Timken,' Kiefer-Stewart,' and Yellow Cab"r urged that
the fact that Goldman was the only shareholder of Goldman Theatres Inc.
should differentiate the case from Nelson. However, the court felt that this
difference did not "impinge" on the "fundamental rule" of the "sound
holding" of Nelson. "In these three decisions there were separate cor-
porate conspirators. Here there is one, acting through its proper agent."'
"'Ibid. "Of course it is familiar law that a substantive offense committed by a cor-
porate employee in the scope of his employment will be imputed to the corporation,
but it remains to be decided whether the fact that the corporate employee may
have acted in concert with other individuals in the commission of the substantive
offense will similarly by imputation implicate the corporation in the conspiracy.
This may be a valid theory, but at least it is novel enough to have called for a cita-
tion of authorities.... It may be that the assent of some agent in supervisory or
executive authority would be necessary to commit a corporation to a conspiracy."
United States v. Thompson-Powell Drilling Co., 196 F. Supp. 571, 578 (N.D. Tex.
1961).
"51953 Trade Cases at 68,161.
"oIbid.
'Ibid.
"u276 F.2d 614 (3rd Cir. 1960).
"Id. at 617.
'Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). See note 257,
intra.
'Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211 (1951). See note
244 infra.
"eUnited States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). See note 238 infra.
276 F.2d at 617.
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Before proceeding with a treatment of the broader intra-enterprise
problem suggested by the preceding case, it may be well to reconstruct the
present position of the law insofar as the more narrow intra-corporate phase
is concerned.' To begin with, a clear statement of the specific problem to
be resolved should be re-expressed. T~he intra-corprate conspiracy concept
would urge that in certain instances a violation of section 1 or of the con-
spiracy portion of section 2 may be based upon the conduct of corporate
officers acting among themselves in behalf of said corporation. In summar-
izing the logical and empirical support for and against such a violation the
variations in which the problem can be raised should be clearly outlined.
Starting with the basic premises that a conspiracy requires two or
more participants, and that a corporation can never act for itself but must
rely upon agents,' the cases dealing with the problem can be placed in
the following categories. First, an action may be brought alleging that the
corporation combined or conspired with a single officer or shareholder in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. ' Secondly, an action may be
brought alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade because of the intra-
corporate conduct of two or more of the corporation officers.'
Of course, each category includes three possible actions, i.e., against
the corporation, against the officer (s) or shareholder (s), or against both.
It is apparent that since two or more persons are required to conspire
and since a corporation can never act for itself, any action based upon the
conduct of a single officer or shareholder is doomed to failure if its sole
basis is a conspiracy allegation under sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.
If there is only one active participant, as was the case in Union Pacific
124Recent opinions which have been handed down have relied heavily on the Nelson
"rule." E.g., Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 167 F. Supp. 860
(1958), wherein the plaintiff had charged a conspiracy "on the part of the cor-
porate defendant, its New York Manager, and certain of its distributors who are
not named." Id. at 861-62. The court, citing Nelson, stated "that the corporate
defendant could not conspire with its own Manager, acting within the scope of his
authority has been decided." Of course, the case which really decided this ques-
tion was Union Pacific Coal, note 18 su pra, and there need be no qualification of
"scope of authority" since it makes no difference in what sphere he acts, if he
acts alone. See note 24 supra. The case of Poller v. Colvmbia Broadcasting Silt-
sem, linc., 2S4 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960), involved a situation in which the plain-
tiff alleged that C.B.S. had conspired with others to acquire his station at a price
below its actual value. The court cited Nel.qon in asserting that "Pollar's charge
thta CBS conspired with one of its unincorporated divisions and two of its em-
ployees is obviously unsound. It is in reality a charge that CBS conspired with
itself." Id. at 603. "We conclude that CBS, its unincorporated division, and its
employees were incapable of conspiring to restrain trade or commerce." Ibid. How-
ever, these comments are gratuitous since the court again found that the actions
complained of were within the legal rights of the defendant. Ibid. See note 2
supra, where the results of this case on appeal to the Supreme Court are discussed.
And see Beacon Fruit & Produce Co. Inc., v. Harris'& Co., Inc., 152 F. Supp. 702
(D. Mass. 1957), where the defendant argued "that there can be no conspiracy
among these defendants since they are a corporation and its principal officers and
directors. It is generally true that the acts of the agents of a corporation in carry-
ing out their duties of formulating the policy of the corporation do not constitute
a conspiracy violative of § 1 of the Act (citing Nelson). But plaintiffs do not rely
merely on this, but claim they can prove that in fact the individual defendants here
conspired to form the defendant corporation as a mere instrumentality to take
over the partnership business as a step in securing control of the market and im-
posing a restraint of trade for their individual benefit. The validity of this con-
tention depends on proof of facts which defendants' do not concede." Id. at 704.05.
'
2 See note 6 supra.
' f6., Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed. 737 (8th Cir. 1909).2 7E.g., Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
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Coal Co.1 and in Goldlawr,' the naming of the corporation as a second
party is a boot-strap fiction, since its only action was that performed by
its officer or shareholder.'
Hence, regardless of whether the action is brought against the corpora-
tion, the officer or shareholder, or both, the only possible result upon
grounds of both logic and precedent, is that a violation of the conspiracy
portions of the Sherman Act can not exist. As has been stated, "... the
conscious participation in the scheme of two or more minds, is indispensable
to an unlawful combination, and it cannot be created by the action of one
man alone.' "
Yet in those situations in which the conduct of the corporation is car-
ried out by two or more persons, the "indispensable" element of two or
more minds is present. The question must now be resolved as to whether
that indispensable element is sufficient to sustain a charge of conspiracy
against either the agents or the corporation.'
Again I would like to stress the basic premise that a corporation can-
not act except through its officers. Therefore, it appears to me that where
the Attorney General's Committee and the cases speak of a "conspiracy
solely between a corporation and its officers or between its officers acting
on its behalf' "' it is failing to analyze the problem carefully. Since a cor-
poration can not act for itself, but must depend on human agents, it must
follow as a corollary that the corporation can not conspire with its officers.
The corporation through its officers may conspire with other parties, such
as with another corporation through its officers, and the officers of a cor-
poration may conspire among themselves on behalf of their corporation, but
it is logically impossible for them to conspire with their own corporation.' T
In those situations where it is felt that the officers of a corporation
have conspired together on behalf of their corporation, actions have been
brought against the agents alone, against the corporation alone, or against
the two combined. In view of what has been said as to the impossibility of
the corporation itself to conspire except through its officers, it is conceiv-
able that a different outcome would result, depending upon who was pro-
ceeded against. Thus there would appear to be less of a conceptual diffi-
culty in charging the officers with the conspiracy than in charging the
mSupra at note 18.
'
29Supra at note 118.
'To charge the corporation with conspiring as a second participant, as must be the
case when only one human agent is involved, is contrary to the basic premise that
a corporation cannot act except through its officers. "Although the corporation has
legal personality for most purposes, for purposes of determining whether there is a
conspiracy the case of an agent and his corporation, when the agent is the sole hu-
man actor, seems analogous to that of the trustee and his trust. The corporation
seems an inanimate object analogous to a bomb or a trust. Plurality in the context
of conspiracy should be viewed as a plurality of human minds, each of which is able
to contribute consciously to the furtherance of the conspiracy." Development8 in
the Law of Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 952 (1959).
'Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed. 737, 745 (8th Cir. 1909). But see
the treatment of the Walbrook case at text following note 199 infra.
'This is assuming, of course, that the conduct sought to be struck down is of an
unreasonable nature. See note 98 supra.
'nCoMMi rI'r REPORT 31.
'"Though it is conceded that the question may be partially one of semantics, it is
none the less asserted that careless use of terms leads to careless analysis. Proper-
ly put, the question is whether the corporation can be held as a principal for con-
spiracies of its officers among themselves on its behalf.
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corporation. In the former instance the defense must sustain the burden
of proving that "these two trees are one," while in the latter instance the
plaintiff must establish that "this is two trees."' Before evaluating their
respective contentions, a brief recapitulation of the cases dealing with the
intra-corporate conspiracy problem will be made.
Of the ten cases previously dealt with, two involved a charge based
upon the conduct of a single active participant," while the remaining
eight concerned conduct carried out by two or more active participants.
Of these eight, in only one instance was the proceeding solely against the
agents,'' three were combined actions against both the corporation and its
officers,' and the remaining four were brought against the corporation
alone.'
As previously noted, the first two cases found no liability and logically
could not have found otherwise."'
In the Patterson case,'l dealing with an action limited to the officers,
there was no question raised against thte possibility of a conspiracy in viola-
tion of section 1 arising from the conduct of officers acting among them-
selves in behalf of their corporation. However, the case did not consider
the liability of the corporation.14
Only one of the three cases brought against both the corporation and
its officers charging a conspiracy under the Sherman Act for conduct of
the officers among themselves in behalf of the corporation actually dealt
with the charge, and then only by indirection. Thus in White Bear,'" while
the court, contrary to the impression created by the Committee Report, did
not consider the section 1 charge, they nonetheless indiscriminately dis-
cussed the section 2 charge of both attempt, and conspiracy, to monopolize,
and found liability against all parties except one, officer who was not close-
ly enough connected to the activities."' Here again, as in Patterson, al-
though the result admittedly could have been sustained upon the attempt
charge, no one thought to argue that "these two trees are one," as preclud-
ing the conspiracy aspect.
The other two cases brought against both the corporation and its offi-
cers did not decide the applicability of a conspiracy charge. In Lorain
Jo urnal,"' the court first dealt with and found liability under the non-
'That is, the burden may be on the defendants to raise the corporate shield as a
defense in the former instance, while in the latter the plaintiff will have to pierce
the corporate veil to find the "indispensible" element. Yet, it is submitted that
the street is either two-way of dead-end.
mI.e., Union Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed. 737 (8th Cir. 1909) ; Gold-
lawr, Inc. v. Schubert, 276 F.2d 614 (3rd Cir. 1960).
'
0
'I.e., Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915).
'I.e., White Bear Theatre Corporation v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir.
1942) ; United States v. Loraine Journal, 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950) ; United
States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Company, 105 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La. 1952).
'nI.e., Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation, 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1937) ;
Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952) ; Marion
County Cooperative Ass'n v. Carnation Company, 114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark. 1953)
Brehm v. Goebel Brewing Company, Trade Cases, 67,431 (W.D. Mich. 1953).
OSee note 130 supra, and acompanying text.
'Patterson v. United States, 222 Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915).
'
2Supra at note 25.
'"White Bear Theatre Corporation v. State Theatre Corporation, 129 F.2d 600 (8th
Cir. 1942).
2"Supra at note 60.
'United States v. Lorain Journal, 92 F. Supp. 794 (N.D. Ohio 1950).
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conspiracy portion of section 2, and so held that a discussion of the intra-
corporate conspiracy doctrine would be of mere "academic" interest.'"' The
government in Times-Picayune,"' although originally including a conspiracy
count in the charges, abandoned that count in its brief at the close of
trial, and relied upon third-party contract and attempt to monopolize
charges.'9  Whether this abandonment was due to confidence in the sus-
tainability of the other charges, caution in urging an esoteric doctrine, a
combination of these, or outright recognition that the thesis of this writer
is "absurd," has not been convincingly demonstrated.4 '
Interestingly enough, none of the four cases in which the action was
brought solely against the corporation found that intra-corporate conduct
could ever be conspiracy under the Sherman Act. As a matter of fact, any-
thing less than a painstaking analysis of them would lead one to infer that
the intra-corporate conspiracy concept is precluded by both logic and
precedent."w In dealing with these cases it is wise to keep in mind the possi-
ble distinction between an action against the corporation based upon the
conduct of the officers acting in its behalf and an action brought against
the officers themselves.' It is also essential that the nature of the conduct
be evaluated, since only if the conduct is such as to impose an unreasonable
restraint on trade is it necessary to determine whether the means of impos-
ing that restraint was by contract, combination, or conspiracy.
The impossibility of an intra-corporate conspiracy was first hinted at
in Kraft-Phenix' in which a, refusal to continue giving a dealer's discount
to the plaintiff because of his refusal to accede to certain demands was held
'
46Supra at note 76.
'United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Company, 105 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. La.
1952).
'See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
'"Justice Burton did not seem to recognize its asserted asininity, inasmuch as he
limited his remarks to the statement that "the complaint alleged that the corpora-
tion, together with four of its officials, was engaging in a combination and con-
spiracy in restraint of interstate commerce in violation of § 1 of the Sherman
Antitrust Act, and in a combination and conspiracy to monopolize such commerce
in violation of § 2 of the Act, as well as attempting to monopolize such commerce
in violation of § 2." Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 145 (1951).
Though he made a later allusion to the possibility of violation of section 1, it
seemed to be centered on the type of conduct, rather than on who was carrying it
out. See note 82 supra.
'E.g., "The conspiracy upon which the plaintiff relies consists simply in the ab-
surd assertain that the defendant, through its officers and agents, conspired with
itself to restrain its trade in its own products." Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v.
Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952). But see note 134 8upra. And further,
".. . the cases uniformly hold that a conspiracy cannot exist between a corpora-
tion and its officers and agents." Marion County Cooperative Ass'n v. Carnation
Co., 114 F. Supp. 58, 62 (W.D. Ark. 1953). But see note 105 supra.
'See note 135 supra, and see note 161 infra.
""In any event, (the) authorities support the proposition that under the Sherman
Act it is the character of the restraint that is important; the form by which a
prohibited type of restraint is imposed is largely irrelevant." Kramer, Does Con-
certed Action Solely Between a Corporation and Its Officers Acting on Its Behalf
in Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section 1 of the Sher-
man, Act? 11 FED. B.J. 130, 139 (1951). Cf., note 98 supra. As previously de-
veloped, note of the' cases which issued the blanket statement that an intra-cor-
porate conspiracy is an impossibility have involved fact situations which have put
the question to the test. In all, the court has been dealing with a situation in
which the conduct was not considered detrimental to the public interest. See e.g.,
note 93 supra and accompanying text.
'"Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corporation, 26 F. Supp. 824 (D. M. 1937).
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not to constitute a cause of action against the corporation. Although it is
apparent that the court felt the conduct was not of a nature to constitute
an unreasonable restraint of trade, the opinion failed to separate the ef-
fects of the end sought from the means used to accomplish such end, and
briefly discussed the intra-corporate problem in the light that the plaintiff
had charged defendant of conspiring with its officers.' The court seemed
to preclude an action against the officers under the Sherman Act in stat-
ing in dicta that if they were impelled by personal motives a common tax
action might lie against them, but such could not be the basis of a Sherman
Act violation on the part of the defendant corporation."n
A second case, which, like Kraft-Phenix, was an attempt by plaintiff
to recover treble damages, is Nelson Radio & Supply Co.' This case also
alleged that defendant corporation conspired with its officers in refusing to
renew plaintiff's distributorship contract when he refused to accede to their
demands. ' In finding that the complaint failed to state a cause of action,
the court went beyond the finding that a statement of facts constituting the
conspiracy was not made, and intimated that an intra-corporate conspiracy
may be impossible." After expressing the truisms that a conspiracy re-
quires two persons, that a corporation cannot conspire with itself (and it
might have added that it cannot conspire with its officers)"' and that the
acts of the agent are the acts of the corporation, the court asserted that
"this is certainly a unique group of conspirators."
The only portions of the opinion with which one might disagree are
those wherein the court attaches great importance to the fact that the offi-
cers were not named as defendants, and that echoing Kraft-Phenix in point-
ing out the absence of motives personal to the officers. As to the former,
it is difficult to see what significance should attach since the liability of the
corporation for the acts of its officers should be determined independently
of whether those officers are joined."' As to the latter, the view that mo-
tive is immaterial would seem preferable, since the law is concerned more
'See notes 53-58 supra and accompanying text.
5This statement should, of course, be limited to the fact situation, in which an un-
reasonable restraint was not found. If the personal motives of the officers were
of a nature to justify an action for unfair competition it is apparent that the cor-
poration could not be held for violating the Sherman Act, but as long as the offi-
cers were operating in the interests of the corporation there seems to be little rea-
son why the corporations purse should not pay the price. If one were to strictly
apply the "scope of duty" test it would be an unusual situation where an injured
person could recover, since no corporation's business is to cause injury.
SNelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952).
"'See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
'See note 89 supra and acocmpanying text.
'See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
m200 F.2d at 914.
mIf the acts of the officers acting in behalf of the cororation is a violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act, there should be no reason for not imputing this guilt
to the corporation whether the private parties are joined or not; therefore the mere
fact that they are not joined should not be given any weight in determining whether
they have so violated the Sherman Act. Indeed, recent authority indicates that
if the officers are accused in their representative capacity they must be charged
under section 14 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 24 (1958), and not under section
1 of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Milk Distributors Ass'n, 200 F. Supp.
792 (D. Md. 1961), noted in 46 MTNN. L. RL-v. 631 (1962). For a general considera-
tion of this and similar problems see Whiting, Antitrust and the Corporate Execu-
tive, 47 VA. L. Ruv. 929 (1961).
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with intent than motive.' Though motive is frequently used to show intent
it should be recognized that the springs of personal motive frequently exist
beyond the dollar sign.'
Yet, in concluding that "in the absence of any allegation whatever to
indicate that the agents of the corporation were acting in other than their
normal capacities, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action based on
conspiracy under Section 1 of the Act,"'" the court left open the possibility
that action in other than a normal capacity could constitute such a con-
spiracy. The court again fails to distinguish clearly between the character
of the conduct and the means by which it is accomplished. Judge Rives,
in dissenting, makes this distinction and indicates that in his opinion the
officers were acting beyond their normal duties.'
Carnation, the third case brought solely against the corporation, re-
lied heavily on Nelson, though the court also failed to distinguish between
the nature of the conduct and its means of execution. Though the court
found the charge of fixing a fictitious price for raw milk was not proved,
and hence that no unreasonable restraint of trade had been imposed, it
went further in making an attack upon the intra-corporate conspiracy doc-
trine.'
One can scarcely disagree with .the court's statement that "a conspiracy
cannot exist between a corporation and its officers," since as before noted,
that is logically and conceptually impossible.1' However, the question with
which we are concerned is whether a conspiracy can exist between the offi-
cers of a corporation acting among themselves in its behalf; and if so,
whether the corporation can be held liable. Since I believe that this possi-
bility is what the court meant to deny, I must, of course, dispute their con-
tention that such is a uniform holding of the cases. Only Nelson of the
many cases they cite remotely supports such a contention and the actual
holding of that case can not be extended so broadly.' This is implicitly
recognized by the instant case when the court concludes that an intra-
corporate conspiracy cannot be committed when the "officers and agents
are acting for the corporation in the ordinary scope of their dities.""'
(Emphasis added.)
A final case in which an action was brought against the corporation
alone charging a violation of the conspiracy portion of the Sherman Act is
Brehm v. Goebel Brewing Co."' Perhaps no other case is so clear and un-
'CUf., United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 543 (1913). "[Bly purposely engaging
in a conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces the result which the statute
is designed to prevent, they are, in legal contemplation, chargeable with intending
that result." It is unclear why "personal" motives should have any bearing on the
matter. See United States v. General Motors Corporation, 121 F.2d 376, 406 (7th
Cir. 1941).
'OSee LAUTEInBACH, MAN, MOTIVES AND MONEY 18-23 (1954).
'200 F.2d at 914.
'Supra at note 97.
"wMarion County Cooperative Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark.
1953).
"'See note 105 supra.
"'See note 134 supra and accompanying text.
'OSubsequent cases have taken the same position in dictum, as is pointed out in note
124 supra, but these in turn have relied on Nelson, and likewise have been involved
with situations in which the thesis has not been put to the test.
"114 F. Supp. at 63.
"frade Cases 67,431 (W.D. Mich. 1953).
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equivocal in attacking the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine. In striking
portions of the complaint the court opines that "it is clear that officers
and employees could not conspire with themselves." To justify this position
the court states that "if the acts ... were within the scope of their employ-
ment, their acts would be those of the corporation, and, of course, if their
doings were outside the scope of their employment, the defendant corpora-
tion would not be bound."' Obviously, these reasons do not support the
first proposition. First, acts within the scope of employment are not only
acts of the corporation but are probably acts which impose no unreasonable
restraint on trade. Secondly, although it is by no means conceded that
"doings" outside the scope of employment would not bind the corporation,
even if it were conceded that the corporation could not be bound, this would
not preclude an action being brought against the officers themselves."8
It is submitted that, contrary to the impression created by the Attorney
General Commitee's Report (i.e., "Since there would concededly be no
liability under Section 1, if a company does business through unincorporated
branches . . . they believe it is wholly unreal to impose liability where it em-
ploys subsidiaries instead")," the intra-corporate conduct of officers acting
in behalf of their corporation can, under certain circumstances, constitute a
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.
To sustain this result it must be recognized that the following elements
must exist to have a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. There must
be an unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and this restraint must be
imposed by means of a contract, combination, or conspiracy. If a specific
course of conduct is proven as imposing an unreasonable restraint, the means
by which it is accomplished can then be looked to, and if it is found to re-
sult from the action of two or more active participants, they can be held
to have conspired to impose that restraint." When they are proceeded
against individually, they should not be permitted to take the "gopher" ap-
proach in asserting that we two men are but one corporation."'
It may be conceptually a little more difficult to justify reaching be-
1"1953 Trade Cases at 68,161.
17See note 161 supra.
"'CoMMITTEE REPORT 35.l3The courts which have dealt with the problem seem to have taken the position
that the easy way to get rid of a fact situation of limited merit is by mouthing a
legal conclusion. The result of such a process may well be that when a situation
arises where a bane occurs, the cure will have been spilled or at least diluted.
There is time enough to decide the problem when a case is presented in which the
court comes to the conclusion that an undesirable end is being achieved, but that
there is no means to prevent it. It is unfortunate to make a premature choice on
the matter, as is being done with the cases which use the Nelson "rule" in situa-
tions which no more called for it than did the source from which it sprang. See
note 85 supra.
'""When a corporation acts through more than one person to accomplish an anti-
social end, the increased likelihood of success, potentialy more serious effects of
the contemplated offense, and the danger of further unlawful conduct which are
the essence of conspiracy rationales are present to the same extent as if the same
persons combined their resources without incorporation. Society is benefited by
viewing a corporation as a single legal entity only when it acts for proper ends.
The policy should not be construed as requiring treatment of the group as an in-
dividual when it plans antisocial activities." Developments in the Law of Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 953 (1959). This has been partially recognized
by Beacon Fruit & Produce Co. v. Harris & Co., 152 F. Supp. 702 (D. Mass. 1957),
discussed in note 124 supra.
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hind the individual officers and holding the corporation liable for the con-
spiracy. Yet once a conspiracy is established, the problem is in reality no
different from any other conspiracy charge. If the corporation can be held
liable for the conspiracy of its officers to defraud the government,' it
should also be liable for the conspiracy of its officers to impose an unreason-
able restraint on interstate trade in its behalf.
The protection against the abuse of the concept envisaged by the Com-
mittee Report:7 is in adhering to the clear-cut requirement that an unrea-
sonable restraint of trade must be imposed. That the "normal commercial
conduct of a single trader acting alone may restrain trade" is conceded.
However, such an assertion does not take account of the fact that what the
Sherman Act is concerned with preventing is unreasonable restraints on
trade.' If, by the adoption of the rationale herein urged, "many activities
of any business could be interdicted"" the necessity for the measure far
surpasses the academic interest which motivated the present treatment.m
INTRA-ENTERPRISE CONDUCT
As previously noted, the term "intra-enterprise conduct" is an apt
description of each of the three types of corporate activities which are the
subject of this paper.' Since the strict intra-corporate phase of the prob-
lem has been previously treated, I am here concerned with that situation
presented by a charge of a Sherman Act conspiracy between a parent and
its subsidiaries or between two corporations subject to the control of the
same individual or individuals. '
It is submitted that, since by definition two legal entities are involved,
the conceptual difficulties which were presented in the case of a strict
intra-corporate conspiracy do not exist.' If this be the case, it is difficult
..'Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F. 2d 477 (3rd Cir. 1939). "In respect to the
corporate appellant, it is well settled law that the guilty intent of officers of a
corporation may be imputed to the corporation itself in order to prove the guilt
of the corporation. [Citing cases.] The guilt of the Mininsohns in our opinion is
not open to doubt and their guilty intent must therefore be imputed to the corporate
appellant of which they are heads." Id. at 478.
"'See note 16 supra and acocmpanying text.
"'See note 287 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of what might possibly
provide the "other factors" (see note 82 supra) to call for an application of an
extension rule.
'See note 39 supra.ThCoMMIrnE Rn'oirr 31.
ltm"If a contrary result were to be reached under the Sherman Act a significant loop-
hole would be afforded corporations engaging, without the assistance of outsiders,
in activities that unreasonably restrain trade." Kramer, op. cit. supra note 152 at
141.
'See note 4 supra and accompanying text.1
'See note 195 infra and accompanying text.
'But this by no means indicates that the doctrine does not have its opposition. In
addition to the minority position of the Committee 'Report on this matter, others
have taken up the cry. E.g., "If this notion (of intra-enterprise conspiracy) de-
velops into accepted doctrine, the implication for American industry and business
may be that the only safe way to avoid violating the Sherman Act is to give up
tie advantages of multicorporate organization and consolidate into single legal
units." McGuade, Conspiracy, Multieorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, 41 VA. L. Rsv. 183 (1955). "Integration may be treated as an of-
fense per se; integration which is efficient and controlled by a rational accounting
system is twice vulnerable; a successfully integrated firm which uses its advantage
in an aggressively competitive manner is in the worst position of all. . . .These
[Vol. 23,
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to see how it can be asserted "that in no instance can a parent and its sub-
sidiary be held guilty of an offense that must be committed by more than
one person."' The justification for such a position rests upon the further
assertion that a company could avoid liability under section 1 by the use
of unincorporated branches rather than subsidiaries and that it therefore
would be "unreal" to hold them guilty in one instance and not in the
other. '
Two objections can be raised to the taking of such a position. To begin
with, as previously developed, it is not necessarily the case that there could
not be liability under section 1, even though the form chosen was that of
expansion by branch and division rather than by subsidiaries.' In the
second place, even though it be conceded that the one form could success-
fully evade liability for a given course of conduct, this is not necessarily a
justification for granting immunity for that same course of conduct car-
ried out in a different form." Admittedly the substance of the matter is
the same in both instances. Yet, it seems to me that the basic error in the
approach of this camp is in failing to recognize that the problem is of
concern only in those instances where the substance of the matter is an un-
reasonable restraint on trade, which requires for its removal only that it
be found to have been accomplished through the medium of a contract,
combination, or, as in this case, a conspiracy. '
Simply because in the one case the defense of a single legal entity is
allowed to preclude liability, and hence to allow perpetuation of the con-
duct, this should not be taken to establish immunity merely because of the
relationship of the two legal entities in the second case. It would be un-
fortunate and unnecessary to allow the first defense to prevail.' The mis-
fortune would be compounded were it used to furnish an escape in the ab-
sence of the conceptual defense on the sole ground that bad it been done
another way no liability would lie.
It would appear that a conceptual difficulty would be presented in only
one situation of those to be considered. Before discussing this possible
difficulty it may be helpful to point out the boundaries within which the
intra-enterprise doctrine might be of concern. As noted, the one category
is concerned with actions between a corporation and its subsidiaries or
solely between subsidiaries."9 It is apparent that to respectably argue an
words have a gloomy sound. Amplified by a few legitimate adjectives and adverbs
they can be made to roar like the crack of doom for the competitive system in the
United States." Adelman, Integration and Antitrust Policy, 63 H&av. L. REV. 27,
76 (1949).
""Yet this is the position taken by some members of the Attorney General's National
Committee. See COMMIrrE RKaOaT 35.
'CoMmUIYEE REPORT 35.
'80Of course, such conduct could be reached on a theory other than that espoused Inthe first section of this article. See e.g., the assertion made by the plaintiff in
Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 82 Sup. Ct. 486, 489, n.4 (1962) that di-
visions should come within the rule as to corporate subsidiaries.
"This would simply become one of the many factors which would have to be weighed
in making a determination as to what form to take. Of course if the measure be-
comes whether the conduct is unreasonable, the result should in almost all instances
be the same. See note 98 supra.
"See note 89 supra.
"'See note 175 supra.
'See note 3 8supra.
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intra-enterprise defense one must restrict the definition of a subsidiary
to those corporations which are either wholly owned by a parent, or if not
wholly owned, then those corporations a majority of whose stock is held
by a parent and the minority by non-competitors for investment purposes
only.'* The second category is concerned with actions between two or more
corporations controlled through stock ownership by the same natural per-
son or persons.' "
The Committee Report points out that the situation where the corpora-
tions are controlled by a single individual's ownership of a majority of the
stock with any minority held for investment purposes only is clearly equi-
valent to a parent-subsidiary relation.'
For this reason no effort will be made to distinguish between the two
categories beyond the following observation on the possible conceptual diffi-
culty.
If two corporations are owned by the same individual and his conduct
alone, acting in their behalf, is the basis of a charge of conspiracy in re-
straint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act, it might be argued
that since only one mind is involved, a conspiracy is impossible.' This
would be based upon the recognized fact that a conspiracy requires a con-
cert of action between two or more individuals. Obviously the prosecution
would be faced with the task of proving that "this is two trees."
Even though it is to be remembered that the Union Pacific Coal Com-
pany case' rejected the possibility of a single corporation combining (con-
spiring) with a single officer, this should not preclude a contrary result in
the present hypothetical. Corporation A through its single officer can be
said to conspire with corporation B through its single officer. This despite
the fact that the officer is the same individual and despite the fact that the
officer himself could conspire with neither corporations as a representative
of that specific corporation.'
One case which has specifically spoken on this subject is Windsor The-
atre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co.,' in which an injunction and damages
were sought as a result of an alleged conspiracy between the two defendant
theatre corporations and six distributors, and between the two defendant
corporations alone.' The defendant corporations were individual movie
exhibitors whose stock was wholly owned by one Goldberg and his wife.
The district court, in dealing with the contention that, even though the
'This is the definition adopted by the Attorney General's Committee, and seems
preferable since it is obvious that otherwise the dealing would be in part with an
actual competitor and hence clearly dual in nature. Cf., United States v. Para-
mount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948) where a dissolution order was based upon
such a rationale.
'See notes 199 and 283 infra and accompanying text for illustrative cases.
'CoMMIrrEE REPORT 35.
'"Plurality in the context of conspiracy should be viewed as a plurality of human
minds, each of which is able to contribute consciously to the furtherance of the con-
spiracy." Developments in the Law of Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HAav. L. REv.
920, 952 (1959).
'wUnion Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 Fed. 737 (8th Cir. 1909), note 18
8upra.
'However, a conviction based upon such a situation was reversed in United States
v. Santa Rita Store Co., 16 N.M. 3, 113 Pac. 620 (1911).
'994 F. Supp. 388 (D. Md. 1950).
'Id. at 390.
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distributors were not co-conspirators,' a conspiracy could nonetheless lie
between the two defendants, stated as follows :'
Corporations can act only through their officers and agents and,
of course, two corporations acting through two or more officers or
agents may be guilty of a conspiracy. But it is elementary that
there can be no conspiracy unless there is a meeting of two or more
minds. In this case there is no evidence ... that other officers or
agents of either corporation had any conscious participation in
Goldberg's competitive activities. It therefore needs no extended
discussion or citation of authorities to show that there could have
been no conspiracy of the two corporations on the evidence in this
case. (Emphasis added.)
Although this language is directly contrary to the reasoning of the previous
paragraph, it is not supported by much authority' and is unnecessary,
since the finding of fact set forth in the opinion and accepted by the cir-
cuit court on appeal indicates that the conduct complained of was not an
unreasonable restraint on trade. ' The court on appeal" stated that
"whether a conspiracy in restraint of trade exists is a question of fact"
and "we are not at liberty to disturb a finding of fact made by the District
Court unless it be clearly erroneous." ' It is apparent that both courts
failed to distinguish verbally between the nature of the conduct and the
means by which it was performed. Yet, in the quoted language from the
circuit court's opinion, it is obvious that the finding of fact upon which
they relied was that there had been no unreasonable restraint of trade.
The statement by the district court that there "could have been" no con-
spiracy in such a situation is a statement of law, and not of fact,' and as
such would have been subject to review by the appeal court without bow-
'In relation to the charge of conspiracy between the exhibitors and the distributors,
the court stated that the latter "did not consider it good business to give up an old
and successfully tried customer for a new and unproved one. In so doing they
acted independently and in no way collectively and the only motive actuating each
of them separately was their ordinary business interests in exercising their lawful
right to select their customers." 94 F. Supp. at 391.
'Id. at 396.
mAs to C.J.S., which is cited in support, little need be said. Squarely in point and
supporting their language is United States v. Santa Rita Store Co., 16 N.M. 3, 113
Pac. 620 (1911). The final authority relied on is Union Pacific Coal Compan,
which, as pointed out at note 197 supra and accompanying text, does not control
the question.
2'Admittedly it would be difficult to conceive of a fact situation in this setting which
would call for the declaration that an unreasonable restraint of trade had been
imposed. Yet if some concatination of events should bring it to pass, the dual en-
tity required for a technical conspiracy is there. But at the least there is time
enough to decide the question when it must be faced. To decide a matter of law,
when the facts make it unnecessary to do so, is open to question.
Windsor Theatre Co. v. Walbrook Amusement Co., 189 F.2d 797 (4th Cir. 1951).
'Id. at 798.
2'Of course, there is more than one way to interpret the statement of the district
court that "there could have been no conspiracy of the two corporations on the
evidence in this case." Note 202 supra. If, by "evidence," the court meant that
dealing with the conduct of the defendant's officer, then the finding is clearly one
of fact, the appeal court was correct in bowing to its discretion, and the case has no
bearing on the present problem. On the other hand, if, by "evidence," the court
was referring to the fact that there had been no finding that other agents had co-
operated with Goldberg, then this finding would be binding as a matter of fact,
but the legal consequence thought to follow therefrom would be a matter of law,
and so open to review by the court of appeals.
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ing to the discretion of the trial court had the factual situation been of a
nature to highlight the ambiguity.'
A review of other cases dealing with the intra-enterprise conspiracy
doctrine clearly indicates that the minority position set forth in the Com-
mittee Report' is without foundation in fact, as well as in logic, since these
show that not only can a parent and its subsidiary be held guilty of an
offense requiring more than one person for its commission, but in fact they
have been so held. And any attempts to weaken the strength of such hold-
ing by rationalization can not remove the hard fact presented by a reading
of the cases."
It is true that many cases which were brought against affiliated cor-
porations and their officers are easily sustained upon other grounds than
that they support the reality of an intra-enterprise conspiracy. For ex-
ample, United States v. Crescent Amusement Co.;2U United States v. Grif-
fith ; and Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States; although charg-
ing conspiracy under section 1, also charged violations under the non-
conspiracy part of section 2, and, in addition, alleged conspiracies between
the affiliated corporations and other parties.
However, the district court in Schine found "that the appellants had
conspired with each other and with the eight major film distributors to
violate section 1 and section 2 of the Sherman Act."'' (Emphasis added.)
Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in upholding this finding, stated that
"the concerted action of the parent company, its subsidiaries and the
named officers and directors . . . was a conspiracy which was not im-
munized by reason of the fact that the members were closely affiliated
rather than independent.''' (Emphasis added.)
Though such language was not imperative to upholding the injunction,
since vertical conspiracies with non-affiliated companies were also charged, '
nonetheless, such an unambiguous statement set forth by the Supreme
Court detracts greatly from the assertion that a parent and its subsidiaries
can never be held in violation of a statute requiring a plurality of actors.
A reading of United States v. New York Great Atlantic & Pacific
Tea Co." further detracts from such a bald assertion. In this case the
named defendant and certain of its subsidiaries and affiliated companies,
and officers of the A&P chain, were found guilty by the district court of
'This case (Windsor), perhaps better than any other, illustrates the dangers of
failing to differentiate between the nature of the conduct and the means by which
it is carried out. See note 98 siipra.
"See note 186 supra.Q2mThus it is submitted that the "notion" of intra-enterprise conspiracy is accepted
doctrine. Of course, the dire implications portended in note 185 supra are unlikely
to come to pass. It seems unlikely that an effort to prosecute a corporate family
for activities which did not affect outsiders would be successful, not because it is
impossible for the family to conspire, but because what they are doing is a reason-
able exercise of their heritage under a "competitive system."
-"323 U.S. 173 (1944)..
334 U.S. 100 (1948).
"334 U.S. 110 (1948).
14Id. at 115.
Id. at 116.2
'
6
"[A] conspiracy between Schine and each of the named distributors was estab-
lished by independent evidence..,." 334 U.S. at 117.
'173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949),
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a conspiracy to restrain and monopolize trade in violation of sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act."' The appeal court stated the issue to be :
Whether there is substantial evidence to show a conspiracy by the
defendants to restrain and monopolize trade in commerce in food
and food products by controlling the terms and conditions upon
which the defendants and their competitors might do business and
by oppressing competitors through the abuse of the defendants'
mass buying and selling power. (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that the charge under section 2 was based upon a
conspiracy to monopolize and so was subject to the same requirement of a
plurality of actors as was the section 1 charge. No extended discussion of
the conduct of the defendants will be made at this point, but it may be
pointed out that much of it was in effect unilateral in the Colgate sense,'
i.e., "suppliers were in effect told that if they did not sell direct to all
customers, A&P would withdraw its patronage."' ' Yet, in all fairness,
it should be admitted that the great power of the defendant coupled with
the flagrant abuse of that power would have sustained a conviction based
on an indictment charging an attempt to monopolize.' But in spite of
this concession it should still be recognized that the charge was conspiracy
and the court so treated it.' Even though conduct in a subsequent case
should not approach the magnitude of an attempt to monopolize, the con-
spiracy avenue has been left open by the A&P case.
The remaining cases dealing with the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine received varying degrees of treatment by the Attorney General's Na-
tional Committee.'m These cases will be discussed in chronological order
and then an effort made to explore, in the setting of the Committee Report,
the implications portended by them.
The first of these cases was United States v. General Motors Corpora,
tion,7 which involved a criminal prosecution for a conspiracy to restrain
interstate trade and commerce in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The defendants were General Motors Corporation (GMC), General Motors
Acceptance Corporation (GMAC), General Motors Sales Corporation
(GMSC), General Motors Acceptance Corporation of Indiana (GMAC of
Indiana), and individual officers. Since GMAC and GMSC are wholly
ow-ned subsidiaries of GMC, and GMAC of Indiana, is a wholly owned
subsidiary of GMAC, the case presents a perfect example of the category
under consideration.
mId. at 81.
2"'Id. at 82.2 See note 230 infra.
2n173 F.2d at 83.
"'While it is not necessary to constitute a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act that a showing be made that competitors were excluded by the use of
monopoly power, [citing case], there is evidence in this record of how some local
grocers were quickly eliminated under the lethal competition put upon them by
A&P when armed with its monopoly power." 173 F.2d at 88. (Emphasis added.)
"'The purpose of Congress was to see to it that competition was not destroyed. To
this end, in the most comprehensive and sensitive terms, Congress provided among
other things that a conspiracy to restrain trade in commerce and to monopolize it
in part should be a criminal offense. That is the offense of which the defendants
stand convincted." 73 F.2d at 87.
'CoMMIrrEE REPORT 32-36.2121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1941).
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In spite of the view taken by some members of the Attorney General's
National Committee that this case "appears more a case of contract than
of conspiracy,"' "in essence the indictment [charges] that the defendants
conspired to restrain unreasonably the interstate trade and commerce."
(Emphasis added.) Although a reading of the case clearly indicates that
the object of the conspiracy practically included a requirement by an un-
written term in the dealer contracts that they finance solely through GMAC,
in fact, the court did not consider this an essential element.' To have
taken such a position may have left the way open for a demurrer to the
indictment which did not name the dealers as co-conspirators nor charge
the defendants with entering into contracts in restraint of trade.' Con-
cededly either charge might have been sustained by the facts of the case.
Yet to assert that in the absence of facts sufficient to sustain such additional
charges a conspiracy could not be found is contrary to the rationale of both
the case and the actions of defendants' counsel who were doubtless well
aware of the strict application of indictment charges in United States v.
Colgate.'
The court in stating "it is plainly inferable from the evidence ...
that a conspiracy had been for-med"' (emphasis added) indicates that
no question existed as to its possibility. Although defense contended that
they are "affiliated and non-competing units engaged in a single enter-
prise and hence.. .in effect a single trader;... and that a combination of
competing units is essential to conspiracy under the Sherman Act," the
court felt that "clearly a vertical combination or combination of non-com-
petitors may conspire to restrain unreasonably the interstate trade and
commerce of third parties and thereby subject themselves to the prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act .... Nor can the appellants enjoy the benefits of
?2 CoMMITTEE REPORT 35. "[T]he ultimate issue [was] whether the motor-car deal-
ers were required, by an unwritten term of their dealership contracts, to use financ-
ing facilities, supplied by a subsidiary or affiliated finance company."
'121 F.2d at 382. Concededly the object may have been to force their dealers to the
use of affiliated finance companies, but why a conspiracy to force compliance to
a scheme for adhesive implied-in-fact contracts is any less a conspiracy is far from
clear. If a conspiracy is able to force compliance, it can always be said that im-
plied contracts are involved.
""The basic issue was whether the appellants had conspired to restrain the trade
and commerce of dealers. It was proper for the Court to exclude all evidence not
relevant to the issue or merely remotely relevant to the issue. The excluded evi-
dence or offers of proof consisted of the failure of appellants' dealer witnesses to
experience coercive treatment at the hands of appellants. Such evidence was not
logically relevant to the issue and had no rational tendency to resolve the question
of conspiracy." 121 F.2d at 405.
'
., George W. Warner & Co. v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., Inc., 167 F. Supp. 860
(E.D.N.Y. 1958). "[I]f the defendant is to meet the conspiracy charge, it is en-
titled to know who the parties to the conspiracy are alleged to have been." Id. at
862.
'250 U.S. 300 (1919). In this case the Supreme Court felt bound to follow the con-
clusion of the trial court as to the interpretation of the indictment, and accepted
the position of the defendant that it alleged "only recognition of the manufac-
turer's undoubted right to specify resale prices and refuse to deal with anyone who
failed to maintain the same." Id. at 306.
n1121 F.2d at 402. "Unquestionably such a conspiracy as here shown violates the
Sherman law, for it operates to force unreasonable terms and conditions upon in-
dependent traders and to impose control restrictions upon their trading, coercive
conduct which necessarily burdens the interstate trade and commence in their
product and unduly limits their liberty to do business In the interstate markets."
Ibid.2"121 F.2d at 404.
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separate corporate identity and escape the consequences of an illegal com-
bination in restraint of trade by insisting that they are in effect a single
trader."' The court, however, alluding to the view held by some of the
Committee members, further asserted that "even if the single trader doc-
trine were applicable, it would not help the appellants. "' Because of this
statement, I feel that the court failed to consider the terms of the indict-
men, though I agree with their conclusion in other respects.'
As an interesting sidelight, it should be pointed out that the jury
convicted the corporations and acquitted the individual officers. In reply
to the claim that this was inconsistent and deserving of a new trial, the
court admitted that, as a matter of logic, reconciliation of the verdicts was
impossible but held that the question was one of whether the conviction was
consistent with the evidence rather than with the acquittal of he indivi-
duals.' "In any event it is conceded that although a corporation acts
only through its agents, their indictment is not a condition precedent to
prosecution against the corporation."
Tlhe complaint in United States v. Yellow Cab Company,' charged a
combination and conspiracy to restrain and monopolize interstate trade and
commerce in the manufacture and sale of taxi cabs. The defendants named
were one Markin, and six corporate defendants more or less controlled by
Markin. The complaint was dismissed by the district court for failure to
state a claim upon which relief might be granted.' The Supreme Court,
in upholding the allegation of conspiracy, concluded that :'
The fact that these restraints occur in a setting described by the
appellees as a vertically integrated enterprise does not necessarily
remove the ban of the Sherman Act. The test of illegality under
the Act is the presence or absence of an unreasonable restraint on
interstate commerce. Such a restraint may result as readily from
a conspiracy among those who are affiliated or integrated under
common ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are
otherwise independent.. .. The corporate interrelationships of the
conspirators, in other words, are not determinative of the ap-
plicability of the Sherman Act. That statute is aimed at substance
rather than form. (Emphasis added.)
It should be pointed out that the complaint charged that the restraint
was "not only effected by the combination . . . but was the primary object
of the combination." '  Since the Court also concluded that "any affilia-
tion or integration flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the
mIbid. The language of the court could be interpreted as implying that if they forego
the benefits of separate corporate identity, they could escape the consequences of
their conduct.
2'121 F.2d at 404.
mSee note 229 8upra.
"In substance the appellants seek to make a case for setting aside the verdict on
what appears to be either a jury mistake or jury leniency operating to their ad-
vantage." 121 F.2d at 411.
"'Ibid. And see note 161 supra.
332 U.S. 218 (1947).
"'For opinion below see 69 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. IIl. 1946).
'N332 U.S. at 227. "And so in this case, the common ownership and control of the
various corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and
conspiracy from the impact of the Act." Ibid.2"632 U.S. at 227.
1.9621
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conspirators from the sanctions which Congress has imposed'" it follows
that either ground would have sustained the position of the' Court. Yet the
language is conclusive that a parent and its subsidiaries can conspire under
the Sherman Act.'
The next case to appear before the Supreme Court was Kiefer-Stewart
Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sans, Inc.2" The defendants in this treble
damage action, which had been successful in the district court but reversed
by the court of appeals," were the named defendant, its wholly owned sub-
sidiaries, Seagram Sales and Calvert, and the latter's wholly owned sub-
sidiary, Calvert Sales." ' The complaint charged that respondents had
"agreed or conspired to sell liquor only to those Indiana wholesalers who
would resell at prices fixed by Seagram and Calvert.""
Among other allegations brought forth by respondents in an unsuc-
cessful effort to sustain the decision of the circuit court was the suggestion
that their status as "mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-
merchandising unit" made it impossible for them to have conspired in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act."' In reversing, the Court stated that "this sug-
gestion runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership and
control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the anti-trust
laws.... The rule is especially applicable where, as here, respondents hold
themselves out as competitors.'""
Here again, efforts have been made to limit the implications of the
case by viewing it as one of concerted action to impose a resale price main-
tenance program by direct contracts and refusals to deal.' These attempts
to bring the case within the ambit of Beech-Nut and away from Colgate is
hamstrung by the facts of the case and the language of the Supreme Court.
It would appear that the case was viewed as compatible with Colgate in
all respects except that two corporate entities were involved.' Thus they
"'Ibid.
.'For a critical analysis of this case and a suggestion that the conduct would more
properly have been reached under section 3 of the Clayton Act see McQuade, Con-
spiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 41 VA. L.
Rov. 183, 189-92 (1955). But compare Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 n.13 (1953), where government counsel indicated doubts
as to whether advertising was a "commodity" under section 3. And see Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), where section 1 had to be
relied on because shipping would not come within the terms of section 3 of the
Clayton Act. And further, the Times-Picayune case indicates that an action under
section 3 is easier to sustain than one under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 345
U.S. at 608-09.
2"340 U.S. 211 (1951).
mFor opinion below, see 182 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1950).
2"In this regard the corporate set-up was similar to that existing in the General Mo-
tors case. See note 225 supra and accompanying text.
'340 U.S. at 212.
"Id. at 215.219Ibid.
"'"The Kiefer-Stewart case may be viewed, consistently with its complaint, as one
of concerted action to carry out and impose a resale price maintenance program,
both by direct contracts and by refusal to sell. This view of the case would place
it with Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Packing Co. and United States V.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., distinguishing the Colgate case on the grounds stated
in the opinion." CoMmirTEE REPORT 35.
""Thus the simple refusal to deal which is permitted by Colgate (see note 230 supra)
was here a result of an agreemnt, but no coercive elements exist. "Petitioner...
was informed by Calvert, however, that the arrangements [to deliver liquor] would
not be carried out because Calvert had 'to go along with Seagram.' " 340 U.S. at
213,
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state that "Seagram and Calvert acting individually perhaps might have
refused to deal with petitioner or with any or all of the Indiana wholesalers.
But the Sherman Act makes it an offense for respondents to agree among
themselves to stop selling to particular customers.'
A final case, which is comparatively easy for the attacker of intra-
enterprise conspiracy to dilute, is United States v. Timken Roller Bearing
Company.' In this case the complaint charged that the defendant had
entered into contracts, agreements, and understandings with French Timken
and British Timken to eliminate competition between themselves and others
in the manufacture and sale of anti-friction bearings in the world market.
British Timken, though originally owned 50% by Timken and 50%
by one Dewar, was at the time of trial owned 30% by Timken, 25% by
Dewar, and the remainder in public holdings. French Timken in turn was
owned 50% by Timken and 50% by British Timken.' It is therefore ap-
parent that the case was not one involving parent-subsidiary relationships
-- neither by definition, nor by actual operations. '
A series of contractual agreements between defendant, British Timken
and its predecessors, and French Timken, clearly stamped them as potential
if not actual competitors. Although defendant asserted inter alia that the
entire undertaking should be labeled a "joint venture" and hence immune
to the Sherman Act, the district court found liability.'
On appeal to the Supreme Court, this finding was upheld.' Appel-
lant contended, inter alia, that the restraints of trade revealed by the dis-
trict court's finding could be justified as "reasonable," since "ancillary"
to the "legal main transaction" of a "joint venture."' In rejecting this
contention, three Justices reaffirmed Kiefer-Stewart in holding that "the
fact there is common ownership or control of the contracting corporations
does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws."' In lan-
guage more pointed to the instant case, they also concluded: "nor do we
find any support in reason or authority for the proposition that agree.
ments between legally separate persons and companies to suppress competi-
tion among themselves and others can be justified by labeling the project
a 'joint venture.' Perhaps every agreement and combination to restrain
trade could be so labeled."'
In a concurring opinion two other Justices would seem to agree with
the reasoning and quoted portion of the language adopted by their three
1id. at 214.
'83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
'5Id. at 292-94.
'See note 193 supra, and 83 F. Supp. at 306. "When in 1928 the American, British
and French Companies agreed to continue their activities, British Timken had
grown from infancy in the bearing industry to a position of dominance and was a
potential competitor with whom defendant had to reckon."
"'"The only conclusion which may properly be drawn is that the restraints were not
ancillary to the 'joint venture.' To the contrary, the arrangements were made to
carry on effectively the combination to eliminate competition between the parties
and to frustrate any competition of outsiders." 83 F. Supp. at 311.
'"'341 U.S. 593 (1951).
25Id. at 597.
2Id. at 598.
Ibid.
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colleagues.' Thus, although they feel that it may seem "strange" to have
a conspiracy between one corporation and another in which it has a large
or major interest, "any other conclusion would open wide the doors for vio-
lation of the Sherman Act .... "
Justice Frankfurter and Justice Jackson each rendered a dissenting
opinion. It is difficult to gain a clear picture as to the precise grounds
upon which they base their disagreement with the majority. But in analyz-
ing their language it will be of assistance to recall the distinction between
the type of conduct being performed and the means of its performance.'
With this distinction in mind it seems clear that Justice Frankfurter,
though he states himself to be associated, "in substance," with the dissent
of Justice Jackson, bases his dissent on an evaluation of the nature of the
restraint. Thus he stresses "the fact that the circumstances of foreign
trade may alter the incidence of what in the setting of domestic commerce
would be a clear case of unreasonable restraint of trade.""
It would likewise appear that the central theme of Justice Jackson's
dissent would be in agreement with the contention of appellant that what it
had done "is reasonable in view of current foreign trade conditions."' '
Thus after dealing with the conspiracy aspect of the case and conceding
an application of the most strict doctrine he pointed out that "we still have
the question whether the arrangement is an unreasonable restraint of trade
or a method and means of carrying on competition in trade."' After
defending his assertion that the latter was more descriptive of the arrange-
ment under attack he concluded with the observation that "this decision
will restrain more trade than it will make free."'
However, it should be recognized that the concession made by Justice
Jackson in moving to his second line of defense would be a grudging one
for any purpose but that of argument. Prior to making such concession
he expressed doubt, correctly, in my view, "that it should be regarded as
an unreasonable restraint of trade for an American industrial concern to
organize foreign subsidiaries, each limited to serving a particular market
area."' His position is reinforced by the admission of government counsel
that had Timken set up separate departments to operate the foreign plants
that "that would not be a conspiracy. You must have two entities to have
a conspiracy." ' Though I am inclined to agree with Judge Rives's view
that government counsel "conceded too much,"'° Justice Jackson accepted
2""It seems to me there can be no valid objection to that part of the opinion which
approves the finding of the District Court that the Timken Roller Bearing Com-
pany has violated §§ 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act." 341 U.S. at 601. (Concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Reed, joined by The Chief Justice.) The difference of these
Justices went to the divertiture decree. Id. at 602.
'id. at 602.
mSee notes 41, 175, and 204 supra.
2"341 U.S. at 605.
Itm .at 599.
2Im d. at 607.
2"Id. at 608.
Itmf. at 606. This, of course, was not the case. See notes 255 and 256 supra. There
is no indication that such innocent conduct would be attacked. A different ques-
tion would be presented if these corporate entities were to embark on a concerted
plan to restrain the trade of outsiders.
2"Quoted by Justice Jackson, 341 U.S. at 606.
=Nelson Radio & Supply Co., Inc., v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 916 (5th Cir. 1952)
(dissenting opinion).
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the distinction drawn in asserting that the result places too much weight
on labels. "'
CONCLUSION
In evaluating the present position of the law in the area of intra-
enterprise conspiracy, I will consider the position of the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Committee in the light of the discussed cases. As expressed
in its Report, the language of the Timken case (and undoubtedly other
cases) has caused some degree of alarm among certain companies who carry
on business through subsidiaries." It is submitted that the fear of these
companies that the setting of prices or division of markets of the sub-
sidiaries by the parent will be held to violate section 1 is unjustified '
The Committee Report puts forth the view that:"'
The substance of the Supreme Court decisions is that concerted
action . . . which has for its purpose or effect coercion or unrea-
sonable restraint on the trade of strangers to those acting in concert
is prohibited by Section 1. . . . Where such concerted action re-
strains no trade and is designed to restrain no trade other than
that of the parent and its subsidiaries, Section 1 is not violated.
And the report goes on to state that " [most members] believe, for exam-
ple, that when a parent and its subsidiary, though short of an attempt to
monopolize, nonetheless plan to drive out a competitor, Section 1 may be
transgressed. "' While I agree with this view wholeheartedly, it is ap-
parent that it makes an explicit admission of the application of the con-
spiracy doctrine to affiliated corporate bodies and is erecting the line of
defense at the point of determining the nature of the conduct. Thus the
issue becomes connected with the "rule of reason"" 0 concept rather than
the intra-enterprise conspiracy concept.
Although certain members take the position that liability can never
be found against corporate families for an offense which must be committed
by more than one person, " the position of the majority, the cases and logic
itself place them on shaky ground. Other members, with an apparent dis-
taste for the reach of conspiracy actions, attempt to reconcile the cases, in
accord with their conception of the purpose of the law," as instances of
contract or of combination, rather than of conspiracy. '""
m341 U.S. at 607.
"'ComiT-EE REPORT 33. This "alarm" has been fed fuel by such alarmists' state-
ments as those set forth in note 185 supra.
"'The position taken by those who oppose the application of an intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine is that, since price fixing is illegal per se, the fixing of prices by
a parent for its subsidiary will be condemned. This, of course, overlooks the fact
that the "substance" and not the "form" controls, and that this can operate for,
as well as against, the corporate family. If the mere fact that they are a "single
trader" will not save them from their foibles, the mere fact that they are not a
single entity will not damn them for their good faith and reasonable conduct. See
note 98 supra.
"COMMITTE REPORT 34.
25Id. at 35.
'See note 39 supra.
'See note 186 8upra.
"See notes 226 and 250 supra.
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Admittedly such cases as General Motors' and Tinken, could have
sustained the same result upon other grounds than that of conspiracy. How-
ever, it is difficult to see how such alternative possibilities should serve to
detract from the uncontradicted fact that a family of corporations can con-
spire among themselves. The language of the cases, the facts with which
they dealt, and the logic behind their statements should serve as a warning
that unreasonable conduct on the part of affiliated corporations will not
necessarily be immunized even though it does not reach the formal stage of
a contract or combination.' Certainly the facts of Kiefer-Stewart clarify
this position. In spite of the attempt to justify this case on other grounds,
it is clear that the conduct involved was of a definte Colgate nature with no
hint of Beech-Nut flavor?
It would seem that much of the concern over the application of the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine in the narrower sense is a result of the
widespread misconception as to the status of the intra-corporate conspiracy
doctrine.' Even though, in my opinion, the fact that some fish escape the
net should not be seriously urged as an impelling reason to release the whole
catch, in this case I feel that the argument need not be met. If the nature
of the conduct is first looked to and a determination made that it imposes
an unreasonable restraint of trade, it should be struck down if such can
be done by a reasonable construction of the enabling'statutes. '
Thus whether an enterprise is operated as a simple corporation, as a
corporate family, or as a corporation with branches, the result should be
the same in all events other than where a single officer is acting. For ex-
ample, if the attempt to fix resale prices were felt to be an unreasonable
restraint of trade, this should be stricken in a Colgate situation just as it
.. Note 225 supra.
'Note 253 supra.
""[T]he theory in back of the Sherman Law is to protect the free movement of
goods in interstate commerce against unreasonable restraints, to assure open inter-
state markets where traders may freely negotiate sales, and to preserve the normal
competitive forces which otherwise might operate in these markets." United States
v. General Motors, 121 F.2d 376, 403 (7th Cir. 1941).
See note 250 supra. In the Beech-Nut case there was manifest an effort to accom-
plish the end sought by highpowered and sharp practices. Colgate, on the other
hand, simply involved, at least as the indictment was interpreted, a flat refusal
to deal. So, too, was the Kiefer-Stewart case, but "then there were two." See
note 251 supra.
283That is, much of the objection taken to the application of the intra-enterprise con-
spiracy doctrine hinges upon the assertion that the alteration to a single corporate
form will save the day. It would indeed seem "absurd" to take the position that
the same type of conduct is reasonable in the one case and unreasonable in the
other. As a practical matter, there is more apt to be unreasonable conduct In the
more complex dealings, but certainly if the retreat into a single shell does not neces-
sitate leaving behind the weapons of the war against free competitive Influences,
then the retreat should be turned to a defeat by the sagacious use of the means at
hand-to wit, the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine.
'Perhaps the greatest objection to reading section 1 to cover such conduct is the
assertion that there is not a substantive offense of restraining trade, but only the
offense of contracting, combining and conspiring in restraint of trade. It seems
that such an assertion begs the question rather than answering it. There would
be no apparent objection to having a statute passed which made it unlawful to
conspire to unreasonably restrain trade, anymore than to declare it a crime to con-
spire to "injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise
or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the constitution or laws
of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1958). With its judicial gloss this is
exactly what the Sherman Act provides.
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was in Kiefer-Stewart and would be if the acting parties were General Mo-
tors and Ford.' Although it can be argued that Colgate was decided upon
the specific ground that only one entity was involved, it is equally as con-
vincing that the basis was a feeling that an attempt by one corporation
was not of a serious enough nature to require action. That is to say, the
rationale, rather than "we are powerless" may have been "we are not con-
cerned." If the concern should arise in a later case brought to test the
reach of United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,' it is submitted that dormant
power lies in section 1 of the Sherman Act.'
Therefore, the permissible course of conduct for any corporation should
be determined by an evaluation of the nature of the undertaking itself,
rather than by an attempt to erect technical and artificial barriers in an
effort to furnish immunity. The first and most secure line of defense to
erect and maintain is that embodied in the "rule of reason" concept.' If
this line is pierced it seems unnecessary that the "single-trader" defense
should prevail except in those rare instances where it is logically impossible
to argue that "this is two trees," and, hence, to be brought within the ambit
of the statute.
'Of course, in a literal Colgate situation, that is, the situation as set forth in the
indictment as interpreted, there could not conceivably be found an unreasonable
restraint of trade. However, if the attempt to circumvent the declared policy
against resale price maintenance were to indulge the subterfuges and circumulocu-
tions of the Beech-Nut case, the fact that the corporation used care enough to en-
gage corporate employees in all activities should not leave the courts powerless to
correct the situation.
-362 U.S. 29 (1960).
2"When the manufacturer's actions, as here, go beyond mere announcement of his
policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he employs other means which effect ad-
herence to his resale prices . . . he has put together a combination in violation of
the Sherman Act." 362 U.S. at 44. (Emphasis added.) Since the Court has to reach
in this case to find outsiders who can be said to be "combining," it appears that
the case approach an intra-corporate combination doctrine. If a company should
adopt a policy of resale price maintenance and attempt to effectuate it by a coding
and reporting system, employing corporate employees to run down and cut off
violators of its policy, would this be the "other means" spoken of in the Parke-
Davis case? If so, it is submitted that calling the group a "combination" rather
than a "conspiracy" will be pointless, since the combination will be for an unlaw-
ful purpose, and this is, of course, a conspiracy.
2mSee note 39 supra.
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